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ABSTRACT 
 Australia’s heavy reliance on oil imported from the Middle East and Asia via 
high-risk oceanic shipping routes undermines its oil security, particularly given the 
increasing tension between its ally the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region. 
This thesis examines the Australian government’s energy policies and ongoing oil 
development programs to answer the following questions: how does Australia try to 
ensure its oil security? And, in what ways will Australia’s strategic partnerships help its 
efforts to improve its energy security? This thesis finds that the Australian government is 
increasingly involved in oil security: it has tried to strengthen its oil security by reducing 
its reliance on imported fuel sources. Nevertheless, this thesis concludes that despite 
Australia’s current efforts, it is still at high risk of losing most of its imported oil supply 
in the event of direct conflict in the Indo-Pacific. This thesis further argues that 
Australia’s current international cooperation and strategic partnerships in the energy 
sector do not directly contribute to strengthening Australia’s oil security. Therefore, 
while continuing to increase domestic oil reserves and production and also decrease its 
oil consumption, Australia most importantly needs to diversify its oil supply regions, 
especially to areas where oil supply lines are not threatened by direct conflict between the 
United States and China. 
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 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Australia is endowed with an abundance of natural resources, such as hydrocarbon, 
uranium, and renewable energy. Given those resources, Australia has consistently been 
ranked among the top ten countries for energy security from 1980 through 2016, according 
to the Global Energy Institute of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.1 This ranking means 
Australia is very strong in energy sustainability, resilience, and affordability. The energy 
sector can fulfill the Australian consumers’ demands, notably for electricity and petroleum.  
Nevertheless, while relatively self-sufficient in several types of energy, Australia 
finds itself increasingly reliant on oil imports from the Middle East and Asia. In fact, 
Australia’s energy oil-security is 90 percent reliant on imports primarily from the Middle 
East and Asia for its domestic consumption.2 With the new geopolitical development of 
the Indo-Pacific and the high risk of maritime security on its oil import routes, the changing 
geopolitics in the region will have significant implications for the country. Realizing this 
uncertainty and high tension in Australia’s oil routes, in February 2018, the Australia-U.S. 
Energy Strategic Partnership Agreement in the Indo-Pacific was created.3 Against the 
background just described, this thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
• How does Australia try to ensure its oil security, especially with its 
vulnerability to oil supply disruptions due to the uncertainty of maritime 
security?  
• In what ways will Australia’s strategic partnership assist in its quest for 
improved energy security? 
 
1 Global Energy Institute of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, International Index of Energy Security 
Risk: Assessing Risk in a Global Energy Market (Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2018), 10, 
https://www.globalenergyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/Final2018Index.pdf. 
2 John Blackburn, Australia’s Liquid Fuel Security Part 2: A Report for NRMA Motoring & Services 
(Sydney, Australia: NRMA Motoring & Services, 2014), 5, https://permaculturenoosa.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/NRMA-Fuel-Security-Report-Pt2.pdf. 
3 Clara Gillispie, “U.S.-Australia Energy Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” The National Bureau of 
Asian Research, last modified January 10, 2020, https://www.nbr.org/publication/u-s-australia-energy-
cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/. 
2 
 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Australia has grown as the middle power in Southeast Asia and has an essential 
political role in this region. Australia has enjoyed stable economic growth since the early 
18th century thanks to many supporting factors. One of the most important factors is its 
abundant energy resources. The energy sector underpins Australia’s economic 
development by enabling the country to meet the needs of its household or business sectors. 
Today, Australia has become an industrialized country with great energy consumers. 
According to the Australian Energy Update 2019, Australian energy consumption reaches 
6,171.7 petajoules,4 94 percent of which is the consumption of fossil fuels (oil, coal, gas)5 
and renewable energy. Fuel oil has an essential role in supporting Australia’s achievements 
that are contributing to 38 percent of Australian total energy consumption,6 primarily for 
transportation, industry, and mining. In the period between 2010 and 2015, Australia lost 
its three refineries due to what the Liquid Fuel Security Review Interim Report said was, 
“a result of surplus refining capacity in the Asian region as demand fell after the Global 
Financial Crisis and a strong Australian dollar during the mining boom, which impacted 
on profitability.”7 Since then, Australia has relied on oil import products up to 90 percent. 
Even though Australia could have overcome the disruption of its oil supply in the past, the 
new geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific has brought unprecedented challenges to its oil security 
supply routes. 
The rise of China creates political problems for the Indo-Pacific region. China’s 
rapid economic growth, the expansion of its military, and its belligerent behavior attracts 
much attention from the world, chiefly the United States. Since 2009, China’s behavior, 
 
4 Australian Government Department of the Environment and Energy, Australian Energy Update 2019 
(Canberra, ACT: Australian Government Department of the Environment and Energy, 2019), 8, 
https://www.energy.gov.au/sites/default/files/australian_energy_statistics_2019_energy_update_report_sept
ember.pdf. 
5 Australian Government Department of the Environment and Energy, 8. 
6 Australian Government Department of the Environment and Energy, 9. 
7 Australian Government Department of the Environment and Energy, Liquid Fuel Security Review: 




according to David Arase, “convinced the United States that China is a revisionist power 
seeking to impose an authoritarian model of governance in Asia which, if successful, would 
end the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific as well as endanger U.S. security and vital 
trade interests”8 The military activities, incidents, and tension, especially in the South 
China Sea, have increased in recent years. The introduction of the U.S. Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept in 2017 was followed by a quadrilateral strategic dialogue 
consisting of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia that tried to enforce rules-based 
order in this region,9 which could lead to military conflict in the future. As an ally of the 
United States, Australia has a significant interest in the stability of the Indo-Pacific region, 
particularly the security of its sea lanes. The energy security, especially the sustainability 
of Australia’s oil supply, affects the developments and capability of the country to fulfill 
its national interest. The measures taken by the Australian government to provide for its 
oil needs under the uncertainty of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region will be 
useful for other countries in this region and will support its oil dependency policy. 
Australia’s measures are also critical to ensure Australia’s sustainability in supporting the 
United States if conflict erupts in the region. That is why it is crucial to understand 
Australia’s preventive actions enabling it to overcome its oil security dependency in the 
event of military conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the relevant literature necessary to provide an accurate 
overview of the Australian energy security framework and conceptual policy. Three main 
areas of research that contribute to this thesis are: the definition of Australian energy 
security, the description geopolitical dynamic in the Indo-Pacific region, and a survey of 
the literature on Australia’s oil security. Defining Australia’s energy security facilitates an 
understanding of the objectives that should be achieved to support Australia’s national 
interests. Furthermore, this literature review explains the geopolitical environment 
 
8 David Arase, Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy Outlook, Trends in Southeast Asia, No. 12 
(Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, September 2019). 
9 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept,” Perspective 
2019, no. 47 (June 7, 2019): 2. 
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situation that will affect the way the Australian government executes any policy action to 
fulfill these goals. Finally, after examining both of the aforementioned areas, the 
literature’s last part discusses Australia’s energy reports and previous research, which 
provides a body of knowledge concerning any issue that has been assessed or will be 
assessed regarding Australia’s energy security within the context of the dynamic situation 
in Indo-Pacific maritime security. 
1. Defining Australia Energy Security 
Energy security has become a popular subject for many scholars, who define it in 
various ways. The relevance of this topic emerged on the eve of World War I, when 
Winston Churchill decided to switch royal navy ship propulsion from coal to oil in order 
to get speed advantages over the German Navy.10 The basic understanding of energy 
security in the Churchill example is purely limited to securing the oil supply. Since then, 
the focus and definition of energy security has evolved and expanded. The authors of 
energy security literature emphasize the different dimensions that affect their 
understanding of the topic. According to Daniel Yergin, energy security is broadly defined 
as “the availability of sufficient supplies at reasonable prices.”11 Similarly, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) states that energy security is “the uninterrupted 
availability of energy sources at an affordable price,” which encompasses investments in 
supporting economic growth needs for the long term and in the short term covers the 
appropriate responses to sudden supply-demand fluctuation.12 These authors highlight the 
economic sector as the basis of their basic energy security definition. Other scholars, like 
Benjamin K. Sovacool et al., define energy security in a broader view, considering several 
related dimensions. They argue energy security is “how to equitably provide available, 
 
10 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (April 2006): 1, ProQuest. 
11 Yergin, 2. 
12 “Energy Security: Reliable, Affordable Access to All Fuels and Energy Sources,” International 
Energy Agency, accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security. 
5 
affordable, reliable, efficient, environmentally benign, proactively governed and socially 
acceptable energy services to end-users.”13  
The latest research by B. W. Ang, W. L. Choong, and T. S. Ng shows that in the 
period between 2001 and 2014, 104 studies in energy security generated 83 different 
definitions for the concept.14 From those definitions, the authors identify the “seven major 
energy security themes or dimensions: Energy availability, infrastructure, energy prices, 
societal effects, environment, governance, and energy efficiency.”15 The result was that by 
categorizing the research based on period, type of sources from official reports and 
journals, and looking at qualitative and quantitative literature, the dominant themes are 
energy availability, infrastructure, and energy prices (see Figure 1).16 For those periods, 
the scholars base their definition on those three themes and then followed with 
environment, social effects, government, and efficiency.  
 
Figure 1. Scholarly coverage of each energy security theme in energy 
security definitions by time period.17 
 
13 Benjamin K. Sovacool et al., “Evaluating Energy Security Performance from 1990 to 2010 for 
Eighteen Countries,” Energy 36, no. 10 (October 2011): 5846, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2011.08.040. 
14 B. W. Ang, W. L. Choong, and T. S. Ng, “Energy Security: Definitions, Dimensions and Indexes,” 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 42 (February 2015): 1078, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.10.064. 
15 Ang, Choong, and Ng, 1081. 
16 Ang, Choong, and Ng, 1083. 
17 Source: Ang, Choong, and Ng, 1083. 
6 
Ang et al. explain further that the energy availability theme covers the supply 
sources diversification and geopolitical factors “such as outbreaks of wars, destabilized 
regimes, or regional tensions which can lead to oil or gas supply disruptions.”18 Secondly, 
the theme of infrastructure includes facilities for energy transformation and transmission. 
Ang et al. further mention that the oil refineries, power plants, “pipelines, electricity 
transmission lines, sub-stations, and energy storage facilities” have to be available and 
maintained in adequate, robust, and good condition to support energy security supplies. 
The third dominant energy security theme is energy prices, which Ang et al. argue is “the 
affordability of energy supplies and has some dimensions such as the absolute price level, 
price volatility, and the degree of competition in energy markets.”19 Those themes, all or 
in part, can be found in the energy sector of official government documents of each country, 
as well as in the Australian government. 
The Australian government defines energy security as a high-level condition in 
three major aspects, namely reliability, affordability, and resiliency of the country’s total 
energy needs. This definition is clearly stated in a government document, the 2011 National 
Energy Security Assessment (NESA), which states: “energy security is defined as the 
adequate, reliable and competitive supply of energy to support the functioning of the 
economy and social development.”20 The first dimension is adequacy, which means that 
Australian energy is sufficiently available to support the needs of economic growth and its 
people’s activities. The second term is reliability, which means the government can 
overcome an energy supply disruption with minimal effects on its people. Moreover, the 
last term is competitiveness, which means Australia  can obtain the needed energy at 
affordable prices. NESA 2011 explains that, in this regard, energy competitiveness “does 
not adversely affect the competitiveness of the economy and that [it] supports continued 
investment in the energy sector.”21 These dimensions are interconnected with supporting 
 
18 Ang, Choong, and Ng, 1081. 
19 Ang, Choong, and Ng, 1082. 
20 Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, National Energy Security 
Assessment 2011 (Canberra, ACT: Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 
2011), 2. 
21 Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2. 
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the Australian people’s activities, which are mainly divided into energy types of electricity, 
fuels, and natural gas. Of these definitions, the Australian government only covers two of 
the seven general themes just discussed, energy availability and energy prices. 
2. Uncertainty of Indo-Pacific Geopolitical Environment 
The rise of China in the mid-20th century brought a new geopolitical term “Indo-
Pacific” to the Asia region. In defining this term, C. Rajah Mohan explains “that the seas 
of the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean must be seen as a single integrated geopolitical 
theater, the ‘Indo-Pacific.’”22 The concept derives from the prime minister of Japan, Shinzo 
Abe, in his speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007. Abe argued that “the Pacific 
and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and 
of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning 
to take on a distinct form.”23 Hence, he integrated the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, 
through which most global economic trading passes. The rapid economic growth of Asian 
countries, especially China and India, highlight the importance of the Indo-Pacific region 
for the interconnection of world development. The primary powers in Asia, the United 
States, Japan, Australia, and India, fear the rise of China can cause instability in the region. 
Furthermore, the term Indo-Pacific geopolitics, initiated by Japan and India, was soon 
adopted by Australia and the United States, and these countries promulgate the Indo-Pacific 
concept in order to manage China’s rise. This aligns with what Chengxin Pan argues, that 
“fueled by their collective anxieties about China’s growing influence in Asia, the ‘Indo-
Pacific’ is not an innocent or neutral description, but is a manufactured super-region 
designed to hedge against a perceived Sino-centric regional order.”24 
 
22 C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 212. 
23 “‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the 
Parliament of the Republic of India,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 22, 2007, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html. 
24 Chengxin Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties About China’s Rise in the Asian 
Regional Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 4 (2014): 453, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.884054. 
8 
China’s rising power and economic might are perceived as a threat to regional 
stability and rule-based order in Asia. The emergence of China has challenged the United 
States as the main actor in providing stability and security in the Pacific and the Indian 
Ocean. China’s remarkable economic growth, followed by its robust buildup of military 
capability, drives a new China foreign strategy approach. According to Mohan, China’s 
rise necessitates a new approach to the importance of sea power as “an inevitable 
consequence of the enormously successful globalization of the Chinese and Indian 
economies in recent decades”25 China uses its naval power projection capability in order 
to protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), economic interests, and other essential 
resources, and eventually, according to Mohan, China and India will “step on each other’s 
toes and those of the Americans, the world’s dominant maritime power.”26 The Chinese 
Navy will continue to check American dominance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the 
coming decades.27 The powerful China military is likely to “create a more favorable 
security environment in its neighborhood” and push the United States far from its region.28 
China’s assertiveness has generated a negative international perception that China poses a 
threat to international order and undermines regional stability. Among China’s provocative 
actions are its establishment of the nine-dash lines that assert its unilateral claim of the 
South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea; the establishment 
of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea; the creation of Spratly 
and Paracel islands for military bases; the implementation of a debt-trap diplomacy 
strategy; its investment in rogue regimes; and its restriction of freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea. 
The United States government takes China’s rise seriously by addressing it in the 
U.S. national strategy policy. In 2011, the Obama administration switched the priority 
focus to the Asia region by promulgating “the pivot to Asia,” or rebalance policy about 
 
25 Mohan, Samudra Manthan Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, 2. 
26 Mohan, 4. 
27 Mohan, 5. 
28 Stephen M. Walt, “Dealing with a Chinese Monroe Doctrine,” New York Times, last modified 
August 26, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-
with-china/dealing-with-a-chinese-monroe-doctrine. 
9 
which the president said: “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential 
of the Asia Pacific region.”29 This policy objective, he said, would “strengthen the United 
States’ (U.S.) bilateral security alliances in Asia, intensify working relationships with 
regional states and the U.S., and boost regional trade and investment.”30 President Obama’s 
rebalancing strategy shows, according to Khushboo Ejaz and Umbreen Javaid, that by 
containing China the “U.S. can grow its alliance in the Asia Pacific again and can engage 
properly.”31 One of the five underlying principles of this strategy is to increase military 
presence for maintaining security stability. The United States posts 60 percent of its naval 
and air force assets in the Pacific as of 2020.32 The purpose is to counter the China Anti-
Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy that according to the Missile Defense Advocacy 
organization can “disrupt freedom of navigation for the United States and the international 
community.”33 Security scholars Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, quoted in Charles Koch 
Institute, argue that China’s A2/AD combines “a series of interrelated missile, sensor, 
guidance, and other technologies designed to deny freedom of movement” and to prevent 
intervenors from getting close to China’s coast in order to launch an attack on China’s 
mainland.34 
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President Donald Trump’s administration, from its start in January 2017, has 
continued to put the United States’ attention on China’s rise with all its assertive behaviors. 
Trump’s leadership continues the Obama rebalance policy, but the current administration 
takes more significant and stronger actions in facing China. In 2017, he adopted the new 
Indo-Pacific geopolitical term, which had been used by Japan, India, and Australia. He 
officially mentioned this term as the free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in the U.S. National 
Security Strategy (NSS).35 The NSS clearly mentions that China tries to “displace the 
United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic 
model, and reorder the region in its favor.”36 China’s unfair political and economic 
behaviors “threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability.”37 
Vice President Mike Pence’s remarks on the administration’s policy towards China in 
October 2018 condemned and criticized China’s economic and military aggression, which 
include stealing American intellectual property and attempting to intervene in the U.S. 
election.38 
Following the NSS, Trump has taken a variety of actions that encompass military, 
political, and economic approaches. Early in 2018, he signed $716 billion to extend U.S. 
military dominance in every domain.39 In May 2018, the U.S. Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis renamed U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) to U.S. Indo-pacific Command 
(USINDOPACOM).40 Since then, the USINDOPACOM has been modernizing and 
expanding capacity to meet the National Defense Strategy that, according the Department 
of Defense, “directs the Department to posture ready, combat-credible forces forward––
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alongside allies and partners––and, if necessary, to fight and win.”41 The Trump 
administration emphasizes security cooperation and partnership among countries in the 
Indo-Pacific region.42 The U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo notes the United States 
has pledged US$300 million for new security cooperation, notably in maritime security.43 
Overall, the United States seeks to strengthen cooperation with its allies, namely Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and Australia. As noted in Chapter I, the current administration has 
revived the quadrilateral strategic dialogue with Japan, Australia, and India, especially 
making India a counterbalance to China’s power in Asia. In doing so, Trump maintains 
Barack Obama’s view that India’s role in Asia, according to Mohan, is “as part of an 
American effort to hedge against China’s rise.”44 In the economic sector, Trump has 
imposed a series of tariffs on Chinese imports that have sparked a trade war. U.S. tariffs 
imposed on Chinese goods in March and July 2018, and in May 2019, totaled $284 billion 
and strained relations between the two countries.45 China retaliated by imposing tariffs on 
American products. To contain China’s economic influence in the region, in October 2018, 
Trump signed the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD Act), 
which appropriates $60 billion to the Indo-Pacific region.46 This reciprocal action has 
increased tension in the U.S.-China relationship that could lead to conflict. 
Many scholars, in fact, argue that the great power competition in the Indo-Pacific 
region will likely lead to conflict. In his 2016 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Jay J. 
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English,47 mentioned several scholars from several perspectives who have argued about 
the potential for conflict between the United States and China. A Chinese scholar, Ji 
Guoxin, stated that SLOC controls competition for the trading routes for regional and 
global resources and will lead the Asia-Pacific region to conflict. Practiced politician Aaron 
L. Friedberg, a former staff member of The White House, has argued from the realist’s and 
pessimist’s points of view that China is ambitious in achieving its national interests, even 
though those ambitions “challenge territorial boundaries, international institutional 
arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were relatively 
weak,”48 and China will continue to behave assertively, which leads to inevitable conflict.49 
Similarly, according to the Global Trends 2030 report, a National Intelligence Council 
publication deduces that the lack of regional security cooperation in Asia will create the 
largest global threats due to fear of China and anxiety over U.S. involvement.50 A political 
scientist, Inhan Kim, claims that there is a tendency for the United States and China to 
engage in a conflict due to the U.S. rebalance policy in Asia that triggers China to become 
aggressive.51 
The Australian government acknowledges the evolving Indo-Pacific geopolitical 
uncertainty. Australia first used the term Indo-Pacific 58 times in the 2013 Australian 
Defense White Paper (2013 ADWP). This paper emphasized that the Indo-Pacific was 
emerging with strategic constructs that would continue to evolve, and as a consequence, 
“Australia’s security environment will be significantly influenced.”52 With the rapid 
change in the Indo-Pacific environment, Australia restated the importance of the Indo-
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Pacific environment for its national interests in its 2016 ADWP and followed it with the 
2017 Australia Foreign Policy White Paper.  
While the 2016 ADWP and 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper acknowledged that 
both cooperation and competition would color the U.S.-China relationship,53 54 during the 
G20 Summit in June 2019, Australian Prime Minister Morrison stated: “the world’s most 
important bilateral relationship is strained: The balance between strategic engagement and 
strategic competition in the US-China relationship has shifted. This was inevitable.” He 
argued “that this competition didn’t have to become adversarial,” but also it was “not 
inevitable that competition leads to conflict.”55 Aligning with the Australian prime 
minister, Linda Reynolds, Australia’s Defense Minister, cites “a deepening sense of 
anxiety about the region’s future,” which she argues is a sign “that the sense of common 
purpose that has long driven economic liberalisation and tighter partnership in our region 
can no longer be taken for granted.”56 
Australia has also acknowledged China’s rising power, and that China’s huge 
military modernization has become a major concern in terms of the Indo-Pacific regional 
stability. The maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea 
have created uncertainty and tension. The 2016 ADWP predicted this uncertainty would 
intensify in the next two decades due to “the changes in the distribution of power in the 
Indo-Pacific and globally” and “the modernisation of regional military capabilities.”57 The 
same document then stated that Australia reshapes its military strength based on the level 
of anxiety in the Indo-Pacific environment and by raising its defense budget to two percent 
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GDP and by “seek[ing] to broaden and deepen its alliance with the United States”58 The 
document also stated that Australia could not achieve its desired security and stability level 
without the United States.59 60 These official statements clearly explain the advantages of 
Australia taking on the United States’ side. 
Australia and the United States have increasingly strengthened their security 
cooperation since the United States executed its “pivot to Asia” policy in responding to 
China’s rising power. The United States claims that historically Australia and the United 
States have fought together “in every significant conflict since World War I, and [the 
United States] continues to reinforce economic and security arrangements that support our 
shared interests and safeguard democratic values across the region.”61 The two countries 
celebrated their “First Hundred Years of Mateship” in 2018.62 Signed by Australia in 2011 
and then ratified in 2014, the U.S. Force Posture Agreement (FPA) aims to “deepen its 
long-standing alliance and further strategic interests in maintaining a strong U.S. presence 
as an anchor of stability in the Asia-Pacific.”63 The FPA mentions Enhanced Air 
Cooperation and the stationing of the U.S. Marine Rotation Force in Darwin that brought 
its total number to 2,500 personnel in 2019. 
Furthermore, in 2014, Australia and the United States also expanded the Australia, 
New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS) security cooperation as “a vehicle for 
engaging Asia-Pacific countries”64 to “ensure Asia-Pacific security.”65 The United States 
and Australia have also held an annual strategic dialogue through Australia–US Ministerial 
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Consultations (AUSMIN) to “deepen bilateral foreign security and defence cooperation.”66 
Additionally, Australia houses the U.S. defense facility knon as “the Pine Gap,” which is 
a U.S. satellite surveillance base important for providing intelligence information and 
ballistic missile early warning.67 The many examples of security cooperation show that 
both countries will undoubtedly continue to strengthen their alliance in the near future.  
3. The Existing Views on Australia’s Oil Security 
The Australian government has taken energy matters seriously by issuing some 
official policy documents to deal with challenges and to harness all possible opportunities 
to resolve the energy trilemma. In 2011, the Department of Resources, Energy, and 
Tourism of the Australian government released the National Energy Security Assessment 
(NESA) report, which updated the previous version from 2009. This assessment provides 
essential basic knowledge for the decision maker in developing Australia’s energy policy 
through the Energy White Paper process.68 NESA 2011 concluded that in general, 
“Australia’s energy security situation is meeting Australia’s economic and social needs,”69 
which means that Australia has high energy security.70 Furthermore, NESA 2011 stated 
Australia does not necessarily have problems, even though the country has a “lack of self-
sufficiency and reliance on global markets.”71 According to NESA 2011, Australia had no 
problem filling Australian demands in three main energy areas. Oil fuels are managed 
diligently enough to sustain any disruption. The adequacy and reliability of the oil supplies 
will not be disturbed in the event of a disruption, but the price would increase for a short 
time, which means that only competitiveness could be affected. 
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Furthermore, under the Department of Industry and Science, the Australian 
government published its energy policy through the latest Energy White Paper (EWP) in 
April 2015. This policy portrays the Australian vision on its energy sectors, which 
comprises effective market competition to get the lowest price, increasing energy 
productivity, and making future Australian energy investment.72 The EWP 2015 
emphasized Australian natural gas and electricity production as the way to foster Australian 
economic growth, and put less attention on the oil sector. Australia’s oil resources are 
limited, which causes that country’s dependency on oil import products. Nevertheless, in 
EWP 2015 the Australian government asserted that the described market approach would 
continue to provide a reliable oil supply “because of the depth, liquidity and diversity of 
international crude and fuel markets” and because this supply is supported by existing 
stockholding and tankers for sea management.73 The Australian government will not, 
however, actively engage in promoting alternative fuels or inventing technology to 
encourage energy efficacy.74 Additionally, the EWP 2015 admitted Australia’s incapability 
to meet the IEA requirement to have 90 days of oil stock in reserve due to the massive cost 
for related infrastructure investment.75 Following the second emphasis in the EWP, the 
Australian government, in December 2015, published its National Energy Productivity 
Plan (NEPP) 2015–2030. The NEPP goal is to improve “Australia’s energy productivity 
by 40 percent between 2015 and 2030.”76 Doing so will strengthen Australian economic 
growth and also contribute to the global challenge of mitigating climate change by 
decreasing CO2 emissions by 5 percent in 2020.77 This commitment reflects the Australian 
government’s awareness of energy trilemma. The NEPP positions Australia as 28th in the 
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2019 World Trilemma ranking for 128 countries in which environmental sustainability was 
the weakest dimension.78  
The latest Australian government publication on fuel security is the Liquid Fuel 
Security Review Interim Report of April 2019, which was initiated after Energy Minister 
Josh Frydenberg asked for an immediate fuel security review in May 2018.79 The reason 
for his request was that Australia’s fuel reserves was sufficient for, on average, 20 days of 
consumption. Nevertheless, he stated it was “not [to] be construed as Australia having a 
fuel security problem”80 The report concluded, “that fuel security is not a problem to be 
solved but, rather, something to be monitored and managed to minimise risks as the market 
adapts to our changing needs over time.”81 Thus, the industry can manage any oil disruption 
and the government will intervene only as a last resort by implementing the Liquid Fuel 
Emergency Act of 1984. Even though Australia is 90 percent dependent on imported oil 
and the country’s continued growth will mean prompt a greater demand for oil, the 
Australian government is unlikely to build storage facilities and new refineries in 
preparation for any disruption of the oil supply due to cost considerations. 
Nevertheless, Australian energy security, especially its oil security, has been 
questioned by the Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO (Ret’d), who released a series of 
reports through the National Roads and Motorists’ Association (NRMA) in 2013 and 2014. 
He criticized Australia’s oil security resilience by arguing that the country’s “liquid fuels 
supply resilience in the face of a potential range of supply shocks is fragile.”82 The rise in 
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dependence on oil imports from 60 percent in 2000 to 90 percent in 201483 and with oil 
reserve levels at less than 23 days due to the decline of domestic oil capacity and the closure 
of several refineries, coupled with increasing oil demand and the lack of oil stockholding 
capability, did not attract Australian government attention to prepare any contingency plan 
for a disruption in the oil supply. The government’s decision entirely relies on market 
forces and global supply chains to assure Australia’s oil security and, thus, endangers 
Australia’s national security.84 Prioritizing the lowest oil price by not intervening in the 
market puts the Australian people indirectly at catastrophic risk should there be a disruption 
in the oil supply. Historically, Australia’s oil security could adjust to disrupted supplies 
caused by global events such as the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian revolution, the Libyan crisis, 
and the Hurricane Katrina; however, that security does not currently take intro 
consideration a broader scenario in which Australia is directly engaged in military conflict.  
The tension in the region has makes Australia’s oil security an important topic in 
that country. Australian senators and military experts have commented on Australia’s 
current level of oil security. In January 2018, Senator Jim Molan, Major General of the 
Australian Army (Ret’d), stated that Australia’s oil reserves were less than 21 days, and as 
a result, Australian military forces would be useless in 19 days, because there is little point 
in “having 12 fantastic submarines and 75 F-35s if you’ve got no bloody fuel for them”85 
Australian energy supplies are critical, he emphasized, and could be cut off quickly by any 
adversaries. His argument was backed up by Dr. Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst for 
Defence Strategy and Capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, who then 
argued that the Australia government has ignored and did not take energy security 
seriously, even though military analysts have warned about it. Furthermore, Dr. Davis 
stated that a military conflict in the Pacific between the United States and China “could be 
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the catalyst to disrupt Australia’s fuel supply.86 Similar support for this view came from 
Professor Peter Leahy, director of the University of Canberra’s National Security Institute 
and former chief of the Australian Army, who argued that the Australian government had 
yet to act since 2013, when John Blackburn wrote the first Australia fuel security report.87 
In 2018, Blackburn followed up his series of reports in 2013 and 2014 with a journal 
article. In that article, he argued the Australian market-based strategy was out of date 
because the environment was not always peaceful and the market would be unable to work 
normally in a conflict situation. He emphasized the importance of viewing energy security 
through a national security lens that integrated all the factors for consideration, not only in 
terms of the economic advantages. Blackburn explained further that Australia was “in a 
strategic warning period for fuel security” due to “the deteriorating security environment 
in the Asia Pacific region” and needed preparation to deal with it.88 His statement aligned 
with the Australia Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) view that “now isn’t the time to pretend 
that a business-as-usual approach in the Australian energy sector is a viable strategy that 
provides support for national energy resilience.”89 The Australian government, according 
to the IEA, is “less clear how the country would respond in the event of a serious oil supply 
disruption leading to market failure.”90 
The instability of the Indo-Pacific region and the probability of conflict directly 
affects Australia’s oil security. Given the previously discusses facts about insecurity in the 
Indo-Pacific region, the Australian alliance with the United States, the determination of 
Australian top leaders, and Australian defense preparedness, if a conflict occurs, Australia 
will have a serious fuel security problem as most oil supply chains are located in the area 
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of conflict, the Indo-Pacific region. This research, however, does not aim to address the 
developing situation in Indo-Pacific maritime security in detail. Rather, this research 
examines the Australian government’s ongoing and planned programs to protect 
Australia’s oil security and how those programs can help Australia’s quest for improved 
energy security against the backdrop  of Indo-Pacific maritime security as described in this 
chapter.  
 POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis primarily addresses Australian energy security policy, the country’s oil 
development programs, and how those programs are helping the country achieve greater 
security in view of increasing uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific that threatens all of its oil 
routes. Building on the available literature presented in the previous section, this thesis 
advances three hypotheses related to the research question. 
First, I hypothesize that the Australian government will need to diversify its sources 
of oil to include countries from outside of the area at risk for conflict. The countries on the 
American continent, for example, are a good alternative because of their stable geopolitical 
condition and ability to avoid passing through the China Sea and other critical choke points, 
such as the Malacca and the Hormuz straits. The establishment of long-term agreements 
and strategic partnerships, such as the Australia−U.S. energy strategic partnership, can help 
to ensure Australia’s energy security. 
Second, I hypothesize that the Australian government will continue to execute a 
market-based driven policy that emphasizes economic advantages, keeps its dependency 
on imported oil, and avoids interfering directly in its oil sector. Australia is also unlikely 
to build new oil infrastructure due to the associated costs, but the country will improve its 
oil reserve capability and capacity so that Australia can respond effectively to short-
medium disruptions in the oil supply. 
Third, I hypothesize that the Australian government will reduce domestic oil 
consumption to improve its energy security. Australia can leverage new technologies to 
convert equipment that uses oil to other fuel types. Furthermore, the Australia government 
can explore production of alternative fuel types to replace oil by drawing on its huge natural 
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gas, coal, and renewable energy resources. The biofuel and hydrogen fuel programs are 
also promising for Australia. 
 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines Australia’s energy situation in detail and the policies that the 
country’s government has adopted to improve its energy security situation. The thesis then 
examines ongoing programs, such as the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and the implications it 
has for Australian energy security. Specifically, the ways in which that strategy potentially 
assists Australia’s quest for improved energy security are analyzed. Finally, several 
recommendations are provided for improving Australian energy security. 
 THESIS OVERVIEW 
This chapter provided background on Australia’s energy security and various 
perspectives on the risk to the oil supply caused by instability in the Indo-Pacific maritime 
environment. Chapter II covers the current status of Australia’s oil security, starting with 
its resources, demand, supply, and challenges. Chapter III discusses the Australian 
government’s energy policy and its development programs. Chapter IV explores the role 
of Australia’s strategic energy partnership in supporting that country’s oil security. Finally, 
Chapter V synthesizes the findings from the previous chapters to assess how Australia’s 
energy policy and development efforts are helping the country achieve greater energy 
security. The chapter concludes by offering recommendations on how Australia could 
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II. AUSTRALIAN ENERGY RESOURCES:  
DEMAND AND THREATS TO SECURITY 
Australia’s population uses a significant amount of energy to support its life  
and development. Each year, the country’s energy needs continue to grow. Australia can 
meet many of its energy needs through its domestic resources supplies of oil, coal, and 
natural gas. Nonetheless, it has started to experience a shortage of domestic oil. Therefore, 
it will need to increase its import of oil products and become more dependent on 
international supply. Australia’s oil supply chains, however, contain a high risk due  
to transit choke points located in the unstable Middle East and uncertain Indo-Pacific 
security environments. 
This chapter shows how Australia lacks of self-sufficiency in fuel oil and is 
dependent on imported oil supplies that are at increased risk of disruption due to SLOCs 
that originate and cross the unstable Middle East and uncertain Indo-Pacific security 
environments. In doing so, this chapter first describes the general overview of the 
Australian energy situation and resources. Next, it discusses the Australian demand for 
three primary energy sources: oil, natural gas, and electricity. This chapter then determines 
the shortages in the Australian domestic energy market. Furthermore, it describes the 
imported-energy sources that Australia uses to fill the gap in the fuel oil sector. Finally, 
this chapter wconcludes with findings about the current energy security situation in 
Australia, primarily fuel oil security, and the factors enabling Australia to overcome its oil 
security issues.  
 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Australia’s population continues to grow and demand more energy annually. In the 
period 2017–18, the Australian population grew 1.6 percent, reaching 25 million people, 
and alongside its increased population, the energy demand also increased by 0.9 percent.91 
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Australian energy consumption reached 6,171.7 petajoules, 94 percent of which was 
consumption of fossil fuels (oil, coal, gas) and the other 6 percent from renewable energy 
(see Table 1).92 In 2016, Australia became one of the top ten energy-consuming countries, 
occupying the eighth position among 24 other countries.93 The transportation, electricity 
supply, and manufacturing sectors have dominated Australian energy consumption, 
together reaching 70 percent of the country’s total energy consumption.94 The three 
primary types of energy consumed by Australia are electricity, oil, and natural gas, and all 
are used for economic development and to meet the basic needs of people. In 2017–18, 
Australian energy consumption for every petajoule generated A$294 million in gross 
domestic product (GDP), an increase of A$50 million more than in the previous decade.95 
Table 1. Australian energy consumption, by fuel type96 
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Fortunately, Australia has a tremendous amount of varied energy resources that 
make it one of the top energy-producing countries in the world. Australia is known as the 
country with the most substantial economy in terms of uranium resources globally, the 
fourth largest in coal resources (black and brown), and it claims abundant conventional and 
unconventional gas resources.97 Having abundant resources such as these allows Australia 
to sufficiently fill the domestic demand and makes it one of the world’s leading energy-
exporting countries. Australia is currently the world’s largest exporter of coal and the 
second-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG).98 The resources are spread out in 
several locations across the country, but mostly in the northwest of Australia. Conversely, 
although it has abundant natural gas, coal, and uranium resources, Australia has limited oil 
resources. The high demand for oil makes Australia a net oil-importing country. 
The energy sector makes a significant contribution to the Australian development 
program and its people’s prosperity. The Australian government, through its Australian 
Energy Update 2019 report, stated that Australia’s energy production reached 18,603 
petajoules between 2017 and 2018.99 In detail, the government explained that production 
increased by four percent due to the increase in natural gas and black coal sector 
production. Furthermore, the government said that two-thirds of this energy production 
was exported, which bolstered the growth of the Australian economy 2.8 percent to A$1.8 
trillion. The Australian government prioritized the energy sector to support and sustain the 
continuity of Australia’s development programs. Crucial to meeting energy demands is the 
importing of crude oil and refined products. Yet, this poses challenges arise due to the 
increasing geopolitical tension that threatens Australia’s oil SLOCs. 
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 ENERGY DEMAND 
Among all types of energy, Australia consumes oil at the highest rate. In 2017–18, 
oil represented almost 39 percent of Australia’s total energy consumption by fuel type, 
reaching 2,387.8 petajoules100 or 52.1 percent101 of Australia’s final energy consumption. 
Most of the oil usage was for the Australian transportation sector, which accounted for 75 
percent of Australian total oil demand, of which 98 percent was used by Australian vehicles 
relying on fuel oil.102 The rising demand especially for road transportation and air travel 
bolstered a significant increase in oil use. In 2017–18, road transportation consumed nearly 
72 percent of fuel oil, followed by air transportation, which took 20 percent.103 In 2019, 
according to Australian motor vehicle registration figures, the number of vehicles in 
Australia reached 20 million, which caused oil demand to rise 2 percent.104 The largest 
increase was for diesel fuel, which doubled due to the trend of Australian people switching 
from vehicles that run on petrol (gasoline) to diesel. The number of diesel vehicles, which 
are used for passenger transport as well as industrial purposes, reached 4.8 million in 
2019,105 and the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE) has 
predicted that diesel consumption will grow by 52 percent from 2016 to 2036.106 This 
number reflects that the Australian people tend to use road vehicles to support their way of 
life and business activities, and this trend is likely to continue for the next decade in step 
with population growth and economic growth. 
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Electricity also has a vital role for the Australian people in that it supports most 
Australian industries and household needs. Electricity represented the second-largest sector 
of Australian energy consumption in 2017–18; it reached 26.3 percent or 1,731.8 
petajoules.107 According to the Australian Department of Industry, Science, Energy, and 
Resources, in 2019, fossil fuel-dominated electricity generation plants contributed 79 
percent of this power; meanwhile, renewable energy contributed 21 percent.108 
Furthermore, the department stated that coal provided 56 percent and natural gas 21 
percent, respectively, of total electricity generation in 2019.109 The use of coal for 
electricity generation, however, has consistently declined from 80 percent in 2017 to 60 
percent in 2018 due to the conversion of coal-fired generation to natural gas-fired 
generation and the development of renewable energy for generation.110 This decline shows 
Australia’s gradual success in committing to support the Paris Climate Agreement by 
decreasing CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, the coal-fired electricity generation still 
contributes signficantly to Australia’s CO2 emissions, which positioned Australia as the 
third-highest CO2-producing country among all IEA members in 2015, with 0.36 kg CO2 
per USD/GDP PPP.111 In light of that issue, the Australian government prioritizes natural 
gas usage to support environmental programs.  
Natural gas is the third-largest source of Australian energy; this is vital to support 
Australian wealth and prosperity. According to the Australian Department of Environment 
and Energy, in 2017–18, Australia’s gas production was 4,731 petajoules, and 33 percent  
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of its output was used for domestic needs.112 Furthermore, the government said that 
Australia’s natural gas consumption reached 25 percent of Australia’s total energy 
consumption; 37 percent alone was used to generate electricity. The use of natural gas to 
generate electricity will continue to grow in response to world efforts to combat climate 
change. Natural gas is the cleanest of fossil fuels in terms of carbon emissions. According 
to Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “natural gas is only half as carbon intensive as coal and a quarter 
less than oil.”113 Converting from coal-fired generation to gas generation can help mitigate 
CO2 emissions while Australia develops more non-fossil fuel or renewable energy sources, 
such as hydro, solar, and wind, in the long term. 
 DOMESTIC SUPPLY RESOURCES AND SHORTAGES 
Australia has been acknowledged as a country with rich and varied energy 
resources. Those resources are exploited for Australian needs, and many are exported, 
which provides substantial revenue to Australia. The appropriate use of its income has 
transformed Australia into a developed country. This section discusses the availability of 
oil, coal, and natural gas and their ability to support Australia’s energy needs for the future. 
1. Oil 
In Australia, oil resources are found in several parts of the Australian continent, 
both onshore and offshore, particularly in the Northern Territory and the northwest  
coast of Australia.114 These resources have been and are still being exploited in ten  
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Bowen/Surat, Bass/Otway, and Gippsland Basins (see Figure 2).115 Most of its oil 
production comes from offshore Western Australia, and this oil is almost entirely destined 
for export. Yet, Australia’s oil production has steadily declined since 2001 due to depleting 
oil reserves and no significant exploitation of new oil fields. Australia’s oil reserves 
accounted for 0.2 percent of the world reserves in 2014,116 and by 2019, this figure had 
decreased to 0.1 percent.117 According to AERA, in 2014–15, oil production declined 4.6 
percent from its peak production in 2001–02.118 In 2017–18, oil production continued 
falling by four percent compared to 2018–19119 or 60 percent lower than in 2000–01.120 
The decline of oil production will continue to occur until at least 2030 if there are no new 
significant oil fields to exploit.121 Except for the Browse and Bass/Otway basins, other 
Australian basins have been exploited more than fifty percent of their oil reserves. 
Currently, the remaining crude oil reserves in these basins are deficient. Australia’s current 
oil production is largely condensate instead of crude oil. In 2018–19, Australia’s oil 
production was 18,293 ML of which condensate accounted for 64 percent122 and 14,739.2 
ML or 80 percent of its production was exported.123  
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Figure 2. Australian oil basins and production124 
Not all Australian crude oil production can be used for Australian refineries’ 
feedstock because oil from the western and eastern parts of Australia have different 
qualities and characteristics. The oil produced in Western Australia does not meet the 
requirement of domestic refineries’ feedstocks.125 Furthermore, the locations of fields are 
too far from most Australian refineries, which are located mostly in eastern Australia. 
Based on those considerations, exporting Western Australia’s oil production is a more 
profitable option. Meanwhile, eastern Australia’s oil production is suitable for domestic 
refineries’ feedstocks. However, its oil reserves amount is limited and on a small scale of 
production. Based on the Australian petroleum statistics of 2020, the eastern oil field 
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Australia has few refineries to produce processed petroleum products. Before 2003, 
Australia had eight operational refineries located mostly in the eastern Australia territory 
(see Figure 3).127 However, from 2003 to 2015, four refineries were closed because they 
could not economically compete due to their small size in comparison to Asian mega 
refineries.128 Consequently, since then, refined domestic products have decreased 
significantly; in 2019, local refineries in Australia met 48 percent of the total demand for 
petroleum products by Australian industries and people. These products were distributed 
through 7,100 service stations.129 However, this percentage included Australia’s exports of 
refined petroleum products. When only domestic consumption is considered, the 
Australian refineries provided only 40 percent of domestic use. This 40 percent share is 
similar to that reported in the 2017–18 report, where it was stated that 40 percent local 
production and 60 percent from imports of refined petroleum products.130 
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Figure 3. Australian refineries131 
The new mega refineries in Asia and the Middle East challenge the competitiveness 
of Australian refineries.132 The high cost for routine maintenance of aging refineries, high 
cost of labor, and low price of refined import products affect the sustainability of 
Australia’s oil refineries in the future. According to Blackburn, a continuing decline in 
Australia’s oil production, if there are no government interventions, Australia will likely 
have no refineries by 2030.133 All existing Australian refineries were constructed in and 
have been in operation since the 1960s and mostly have run at 90 percent production  
 
 
131 Source: Fuel Equipment Specialists Tanks, “Crude Oil Refining and Australia’s Fuel Security.” 
132 ANZ Terminals Pty Ltd, Submission to the Liquid Fuel Security Review (Melbourne Australia: 
ANZ Terminals Pty Ltd, 2019), 7, https://www.environment.gov.au/submissions/liquid-fuel-security-
review/anz-terminals.pdf. 
133 Blackburn, Australia’s Liquid Fuel Security Part 2: A Report for NRMA Motoring & Services, 8. 
33 
capacity.134 This situation means that current production from Australian refineries meets 
less than half to the demand for refined petroleum products and cannot be bolstered to 
produce much more than current production; they have almost reached their maximal 
production level. 
Australia’s domestic oil production contributes a small percentage in meeting 
Australia’s oil needs, and it will likely continue to decline in the future. Australia’s 
indigenous oil production contribution to its refineries’ feedstocks in 2018–19 was 19.2 
percent, which means that crude oil import reached 80.8 percent.135 It can be calculated 
that domestic oil production suitable to Australia’s oil refineries only contributed nine 
percent of total refined petroleum product consumption. In total, Australia’s dependence 
on oil imports, both crude oil and refined petroleum product, reached 91 percent. Even if 
all crude oil production in 2018–19 had been used for domestic refineries’ feedstocks, this 
production would only have covered 25 percent of Australian refined petroleum product 
consumption.136 As early as 2030, Australia is predicted to be 100 percent dependent on 
petroleum imports if there are no upgrades to its refineries or decline in demand.137 
2. Coal 
Australia has a substantial amount of coal reserves that can support the energy 
needed by Australia for a very long time and bring in significant revenue as an Australian 
export commodity.138 At the end of 2019, Australia’s total proven coal reserves ranked  
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third in the world behind the Russian Federation and the United States, with 13.9 percent 
of world coal reserves.139 This immense value gives Australia a source of energy for its 
people and industries. The industries exploit coal resources to generate electricity and to 
produce an excellent export commodity. At the end of 2019, Australian coal production 
was the third-largest in the world, with 7.8 percent of total world production behind China 
and the United States,140 of which 74 percent of its production was exported. This made 
Australia the largest coal exporter.141 Meanwhile, Australia consumes a small amount of 
its coal production; at the end of 2019, it consumed only 14 percent of its total coal 
production.142 Most of its consumption has been used to generate electricity for household 
and industry needs. 
Australia’s coal resources consist of two different types of coal: black and brown. 
Both can be found mostly in the eastern part of the Australian continent. Queensland and 
New South Wales have most of the coal resources (see Figure 4).143 At the end of 2018, 
Australia had 10 percent of the world’s black coal resources and 24 percent of world’s 
brown coal resources.144 By 2018, it was estimated that Australia’s total measured, 
indicated, and inferred black coal resources could support Australia for the next 68 years, 
whereas brown coal could support Australia for the next 1,000 years with the same amount 
of annual coal extraction as in 2018.145  
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Figure 4. Australian coal resources146 
Australian coal availability will likely be able to support Australian energy needs 
longer than predicted in 2018 due to the wave of activist movements in the world and 
domestically because of concern for climate change. On November 10, 2016, Australia 
ratified the Paris Climate Agreement; since then, Australia has tried to reduce its CO2 
emission by intensifying the use of more friendly energy sources such as natural gas and 
renewable energy.147 These efforts will automatically reduce the use of coal, including in 
Australia, which will prolong coal availability. 
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Australia’s domestic coal consumption is used mostly to produce electricity. Even 
though the trend of coal use is declining, coal is still the most significant contributor to 
electricity generation. In 2019, according to Australian Energy Statistics 2019, coal 
contributed to 56 percent of total electricity production.148 The most important fact to be 
highlighted is that coal can meet Australian needs as the source of electricity. With 
tremendous reserves, in case there is a surging demand for electricity, Australia can rely 
on coal to produce more electricity in the future. 
3. Natural Gas 
Australia is rich in gas resources inshore and offshore across the country. Based on 
the Australian Energy Resources Assessment (AERA), Australia has 14 basins containing 
gas resources, of which the Browse, Carnarvon, and Bonaparte basins, located in the 
northwest part of the continent, are the most significant contributors (see Figure 5).149  
The Australian gas resources consist of conventional gas and unconventional gas, such as 
tight gas, shale gas, and coal seam gas. In 2015, Australia’s total gas resources were 
approximately 279,685 petajoules, an amount that Geoscience Australia estimated would 
last for 106 years at that time, given average production, and its gas reserves could support 
Australia for the next 47 years. Due to the massive development and exploitation of natural 
gas as LNG as a profitable export commodity, the Australian gas reserves at the end of 
2019 were 84.4 trillion cubic meters, which will last for 22 years at a 153.5 billion cubic 
meters production level.150 Australia became the world’s largest LNG exporter in 2019 
with the volume of exported gas reaching 77 million tons, giving Australia revenue of A$49 
billion.151 According to the Australian Department of Industry, Science Energy, and 
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Resources, this trend will continue for the next two years, and Australian LNG export is 
predicted to reach its peak of 80 million tons in 2020–2021.152 
 
Figure 5. Australian gas resources153 
Australian gas availability will continue supporting Australian gas needs longer 
than predicted at the end of 2019 due to a decline in LNG export. The Australian Industry, 
Science, Energy, and Resources Department forecasts that Australian LNG exports will 
decline in 2021 to roughly 50 million tons.154 The production output, in turn, will also 
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decline due to the low oil prices that reduce capital expenditure. According to the 
Resources and Energy Quarterly report of June 2020, this situation has led to a suspension 
of additional investment in the exploitation of new gas fields to replace exhausted gas 
fields.155 The report adds that four LNG projects have also been delayed for that reason.  
 IMPORT SUPPLY RESOURCES 
Australia imports oil products to meet its domestic demand because this demand 
exceeds its local production capacity. Given the declining levels of its oil reserves and the 
closures of its four refineries after its peak oil production in 2000–1, Australia gradually 
came to rely on imported oil to meet its domestic consumption. A supply disruption helped 
spark awareness of oil security among Australian strategic experts and scholars. This 
situation required the Australian government, in 2017, to issue a policy that obligated all 
companies to report monthly on their oil status. The newest official information from the 
Australian government was reported in Australian Petroleum Statistics issued in May 
2020. Based on the data presented in this report, in 2018–19, the calculation showed that 
Australia’s oil imports reached 91 percent in 2019 from 60,644.1 petajoules total oil 
consumption.156 This percentage was divided into two types, namely crude oil and refined 
petroleum products, with refined petroleum imports reaching 60 percent, and crude oil 
imports accounting for 81 percent of its total domestic demand.  
Australia imports oil from many different countries in order to strengthen its supply 
against disruption. In 2018–19, crude oil was imported from 26 countries, led by Malaysia, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Brunei Darussalam, with percentages from total 
crude oil import, respectively, of 31 percent, 17 percent, and 7 percent (see Figure 6).157 
Unfortunately, there is an imbalance among the regions that export their oil to Australia. 
In 2018–19, Australia imported 11,818.2 ML of crude oil, mostly from Southeast Asian 
countries, which represents 55 percent of its total crude oil imports. The Middle East region 
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follows as the second supplier, with a 20 percent crude oil contribution. This percentage 
means that the uncertain geopolitical situation in the Southeast Asia region will have a 
severe impact on Australia’s oil security, namely crude oil supply disruption. 
Unfortunately, most of these countries have maritime border disputes with China that 
continue today, which adds risk to Australia’s oil security.158 
 
Figure 6. Australian crude oil countries’ supplier159 
Though the Australian import of refined oil products is dominated by 
Southeast/East Asian countries as suppliers, most of this oil actually originates in the 
Middle East. Similar to crude oil import, 26 countries supply refined products to Australia 
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to complement its refineries’ products. In 2018–19, Singapore (27 percent), the Republic 
of South Korea (21 percent), Japan (16 percent), and China (11 percent) were the four 
largest suppliers, representing a combined 75 percent of total Australian refined products 
import.160 Yet, according to the Liquified Fuel Security Review-Interim Report 2019, the 
first three contributing countries do not have their own resources’ feedstocks, which means 
these countries are net crude oil importers that are primarily or over 80 percent dependent 
on the Middle East region as their provider.161 These countries are known as service-
producing countries whereby they import crude oil, refine it, and sell the finished products 
to get income. Similarly, the Observatory of Economic Complexity’s (OEC) official 
website also presented data that, in 2018, Singapore (76 percent),162 Japan (88 percent),163 
and South Korea (70 percent) relied on the Middle East oil supply.164 This data has shown 
that the Middle East indirectly contributes 64 percent of Australian imported refined 
petroleum products or 39 percent of total Australian refined petroleum products 
consumption. Incorporating the Middle East crude oil supply that directly supplies 
Australian refineries and indirectly supplies the contributors to Australia’s refined 
products, the Middle East region contributes to nearly 50 percent of all Australian 
petroleum products consumed.  
SLOCs for the Australian petroleum supply vary by time of delivery, which will 
affect Australia’s oil security differently in case of a supply disruption (see Figure 7).165 
Australia’s oil business is based on the market system, which means the market handles 
and adjusts oil resilience. Market-based system principles always want to get profit as 
much as possible. That is why the majority of Australian petroleum resources are derived 
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from nearby Australian countries. The suppliers are mostly located in Southeast Asia and 
the East Asian region. On average, Southeast Asia needs 9–14 days to transport its product 
to Australia; meanwhile, Australia needs 10–19 days to get petroleum products from the 
East Asian countries.166 Both regions give Australia more profits by cutting transportation 
costs as fewer days are required for transport. 
 
Figure 7. Australian petroleum sea lines of communication (SLOC)167 
Supported by domestic oil resources and imported oil products, Australia currently 
has an average oil reserve per type of product of less than one month. Based on the 2020 
petroleum statistics report, in 2018–19, Australia had sufficient supplies to cover an 
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average of 29 days of petroleum consumption, where stock consisted of the following 
types: crude oil and refineries feedstocks for 27 days, LPG 68 days, automotive gasoline 
for 23 days, aviation gasoline for 124 days, aviation turbine fuel for 25 days, diesel oil for 
20 days, fuel oil for 72 days, lubricating oils for 60 days, and other products for 275 days.168 
The primary petroleum products such as gasoline, diesel, and aviation turbine fuel have 20 
days of stock for daily consumption. In 2018–19, Australia only had 55 days of its 
petroleum stockholding based on the IEA calculation method.169 This number made 
Australia the only IEA member that did not meet the IEA obligation to hold 90 days worth 
of stock. In May 2020, with a small increase, Australia had 59 days of oil in stock.170 
 FINDINGS 
Given the facts presented in this chapter, it appears that Australia’s domestic 
resources give Australia strong energy reliability, affordability, and resilience in the 
electricity and gas sector. On the other hand, Australia lacks those characteristics in the oil 
sector, where the availability of Australian oil at current production levels will be depleted 
in the next decade. Since no other innovations or policy developments are coming from the 
Australian government, Australia will be totally dependent on imported fuel oil, both for 
crude oil refineries’ feedstocks and for refined petroleum products. Eventually, its 
dependence on importing oil products will weaken Australia’s energy security, especially 
its reliability and resilience due to the high risk of oil supply disruption. 
Australia has self-sufficiency in meeting energy demands for three of its four 
primary energy needs supports the survival of the country and enables its citizens to 
prosper. The need for coal, gas, and renewable energy can be met by Australia’s abundant 
domestic resources, which will remain available for the next several decades. Even these 
resources can support Australia if there is a surge in demand for electricity. These resources 
also give Australia a great potential to convert them to alternative fuels. The new 
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technologies in advanced machinery and vehicles that use other than oil-based fuel can 
bolster Australia’s energy security. 
Meanwhile, Australia has limited oil resources, making Australia dependent on the 
supply of imported oil products. Domestic oil production only accounts for 10 percent of 
Australia’s oil needs, while the rest comes from abroad. Furthermore, Australia cannot use 
all of its domestic oil production because the characteristics of Australian oil, which comes 
primarily from the western part of the country, do not meet the requirements of the 
country’s refineries. Unfortunately, Australia has only a small number of oil resources in 
the east suitable for refining. Australia now has four refineries that have reached maximum 
production levels and have been operating since the 1960s. These old refineries can only 
meet 48 percent of the total consumption of Australian processed products. Over time, as 
Australian domestic oil approaches total depletion, these refineries will no longerbe as 
competitive and profitable as some of the new mega refineries in Asia, and by 2030, they 
will no longer be available. Thus, Australia will be entirely dependent on imported 
products. 
Nowadays, Australia imports 91 percent of its total oil product for domestic 
consumption, consisting of 81 percent for its crude oil needs and 60 percent for its refined 
petroleum products demand. This dependency makes Australia very vulnerable to 
disruptions in its oil supply. Australia does benefit, however, from its strategic location, 
accessible from two open oceans, namely the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Yet, for 
now, Australia’s position is not as advantageous when viewed from the SLOCs that supply 
Australia’s oil needs because those SLOCs have to transit risky choke points. Specifically, 
Australia’s oil SLOC has two precarious choke points, namely the Strait of Hormuz as the 
gate to Middle East oil suppliers and the Strait of Malacca as the gate to Southeast Asia 
and South Asia. 
The Middle East is known as an unstable region, marked by the uncertainty of its 
geopolitical situation consisting of the long-lasting tribal conflicts, extremist organizations, 
rogue regimes, and belligerent actors. Moshe Ya’alon, a former Israeli defense minister 
who has worked at think tanks on Middle East and strategic studies, argued that, compared 
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to ISIS and Turkey, Iran was the most dangerous element for Middle East stability.171 Iran’s 
proxy war strategies and the Iranian hatred and distrust of the United States172 could drag 
the region into conflict. Due to its control of the northern Hormuz Strait, Iran’s 
aggressiveness is a serious threat to the international energy supply. The strait is a gateway 
for tanker traffic carrying 90 percent of the oil from the Persian Gulf.173 There is a 
possibility of Iran blocking the strait174 that influences the flow of oil to the global market 
so that Iran can gain leverage.175 According to Caitlin Talmadge, an associate professor at 
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a core faculty member of the Security 
Studies Program who released research in 2008, said an Iranian blockade of the Hormuz 
Strait would take time for the United States and its allies to resolve: the shortest operation 
taking 37 days and longest 112 days.176 To date, Iranian military capabilities are believed 
to be stronger than they were in 2008, which means that the time for a military campaign 
to break up the closure of the Hormuz strait would now be even longer than Talmadge 
predicted.  
The closure of the Hormuz Strait threatens Australia’s oil security due to supply 
disruption or delay. The Hormuz’s blockage would cause Australia to lose 50 percent of 
its oil supply, mainly 39 percent of its refined petroleum products supply. Using 
Talmadge’s longest estimated time for a military campaign to open the Hormuz Strait in 
112 days, the current Australian stockholding that, on average, has a 20-day supply of 
refined petroleum products to meet daily consumption, or 55 days’ worth of reserves 
according to the IEA calculation method, would be severely depleted after a month of 
supply disruption. The delayed supply would be longer than 112 days due to the addition 
of transit time from the Middle East to Australia. It takes 25 days to transport the oil and 
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additional time to convert crude oil to refined petroleum products in its contributors’ 
countries. Roughly speaking, if the Hormuz Strait were blocked, Australia would have at 
least 137 days of delayed oil supply. 
Regardless of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East, Australia’s current 
imported oil supply chain is at high risk due to geopolitical uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific 
region, especially in the South China Sea. As explained in Chapter I, there is a high 
likelihood of direct conflict in the Indo-Pacific region due to rising tensions between the 
United States and China. The outbreak of conflict in this area would directly disrupt 
Australia’s imported oil supplies. The main contributors to refined Australian products, 
namely Singapore, Japan, and South Korea, are located in this region. Roughly speaking, 
by adding China, the war would disrupt the supply of refined Australian products by 75 
percent. Even worse, such a war would also have the possibility of causing Southeast Asian 
countries to be unable to export 55 percent of their crude oil contribution to Australia. 
China’s military dominance and the location’s proximity can threaten and pressure 
Australia’s crude oil suppliers in the region. China has a rational objective in case war 
happens to stop all logistical supplies to its opponents. Breaking the opponent’s logistics 
line is a common strategy in military operations to win a war. As explained in the previous 
chapter, Australia, Japan, and South Korea are allies of the United States. Should a conflict 
occur, there is no doubt that Australia will participate and side with the United States. War 
in the Indo-Pacific region would cause Australia to lose 67 percent of its total imported oil 
supply. Therefore, it is important for Australia to find appropriate measures to strengthen 
its oil security both domestically and by leveraging international cooperation, topics that 
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III. DOMESTIC AUSTRALIAN OIL DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECTS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO 
AUSTRALIA’S OIL SECURITY 
As Chapter II explains, Australia is heavily dependent on imported oil supplies that 
carry a high risk of disruption. Australia’s dependence on oil imports has raised concerns 
among Australian strategic experts over, such possible supply disruptions. In particular, 
the geopolitical uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific region, where Australia’s SLOCs are 
located, threatens the security of oil supplies that support the Australian economy. The 
significance of oil in Australia’s economic development has propelled the Australian 
government to strengthen its oil security through several domestic efforts. These internal 
initiatives aim to increase the country’s oil reserves and reduce its oil consumption through 
the use of technological advances in the transportation sector and the petroleum industry. 
This chapter describes the Australian government programs devoted to 
strengthening Australia’s oil security and assesses their potential contributions. First, this 
chapter offers a general overview of those programs. Second, it describes Australia’s 
development of conventional oil field exploration. Then, it explains the country’s projects 
to increase national oil reserves, including its domestic storage facilities plan. This chapter 
then examines developments in the Australian government’s harnessing of vehicle 
technology, namely electric vehicles (EV), to decrease its demand for oil in the 
transportation sector. Next, Australia’s emerging unconventional oil development, such as 
shale oil and tight oil, is explored. Finally, this chapter analyzes these programs’ overall 
contributions to the enhancement of Australia’s oil security and argues that in the long 
term, Australia’s oil security will be boosted by EV adoption and shale oil production, 
while domestic strategic oil reserves and a new refinery will soon make a significant 
contribution to Australia’s oil security. 
 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S DOMESTIC OIL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Despite its persistent claims that Australia’s oil security is strong and reliable, the 
Australian government has in fact taken some actions that indicate a change in its stance 
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on oil security. In its several official reports and policies, such as the NESA 2011, the 
Energy White Paper 2015, the Liquid Fuel Security Review Interim Report 2018, and the 
Department of Industry website, the Australian government, based on historical experience 
and the market’s flexibility in responding to oil supply shocks, strongly claims that 
Australia has reliable oil security. Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter II, after the closure of 
some Australian refineries from 2003 to 2015, some strategic experts lost confidence in 
Australia’s oil security. In addition, increasing geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific 
region, especially between Australia’s ally, the United States, and China, may be a threat 
to Australian SLOCs.  
The Australian government therefore seeks to increase its oil security by increasing 
Australia’s oil reserves and decreasing its oil consumption. These efforts are its main 
strategy since, while Australia is still trying to discover new offshore oil fields, there is no 
new conventional crude oil production to increase the oil supply to its refineries. It appears 
that the government believes that by decreasing the country’s oil demands, Australian 
indigenous oil and domestic refineries’ production will be closer to meeting Australia’s oil 
needs, making Australia’s oil security stronger. 
Australia’s domestic efforts to enhance its oil security mostly involve leveraging 
innovation and harnessing the latest technology. According to the World Economic Forum 
2010, Australia is in the third of Porter’s economic development stages, namely the 
innovation-driven stage.177 According to Porter, countries in the innovation stage have “the 
ability to produce innovative products and services at the global technology frontier using 
the most advanced methods becomes the dominant source of competitive advantage.”178 
Advanced technology in the vehicle sector and recent innovation in alternative oil 
production are Australia’s primary means to achieve its oil policy goals, particularly by 
strengthening its petroleum product reserves. Moreover, according to the Australian 
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Energy White Paper 2015, EVs will potentially contribute to decreasing the country’s oil 
consumption,179 along with future fuel oil alternatives such as shale oil, hydrogen, and 
synthetic fuel.180 The Australian government therefore seems to be pursuing the solutions 
stated in its EWP 2015, in addition to its attempts to find new conventional oil projects and 
thereby increase its oil reserves. 
 CONVENTIONAL OIL EXPLORATION 
One of Australia’s domestic approaches to increasing its oil security is exploring 
new conventional oil fields to increase its domestic oil production for its refineries’ 
feedstocks. The exploration of new oil fields is being carried out by the Australian 
government, but it has not yielded any tangible results. According to the Australian 
Department of Industry, in 2019, Australia’s oil exploration expenditure rose 30 percent, 
to A$880 million, after a decline in spending since 2013.181 This rise in exploration 
spending reflects the Australian government’s desire to increase its domestic oil production 
and its concern about its dependence on oil imports.  
Currently, the Australian government has discovered two significant offshore oil 
fields: the Dorado field in the northwest of Australia and the Great Australian Bight on 
Australia’s southern coast. Nevertheless, those projects are unlikely to strengthen 
Australia’s oil security due to exorbitant production costs and the prospects of its oil quality 
being unsuitable for the Australian oil refineries’ feedstocks. 
The Dorado drilling project promises significant production in the future, but its 
production does not appear to be supportive of domestic refineries’ feedstocks to enhance 
Australia’s oil security. According to Adrian Cook, Carnarvon’s managing director and 
CEO, Dorado has potential crude oil resources of 171 million barrels, making it one of the 
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largest oil fields found in the North West Shelf.182 Dorado is predicted to produce oil 
starting in 2023 and will increase Australian crude oil production.183 Due to its location in 
Western Australia, however, there is a high probability that Dorado’s oil shares 
characteristics with oil from other Australian oil basins, such as Carnarvon and Browse 
basin. As was explained in the previous chapter, the characteristics and quality of Western 
Australian oil do not meet Australian refineries’ requirements; Dorado’s oil would be more 
beneficial to export instead of using it for domestic refineries’ feedstocks. Therefore, this 
project ultimately does not enhance Australia’s oil security. 
Meanwhile, a promising field oil project, the Great Australian Bight, was canceled, 
leaving Australia missing an opportunity to reduce its dependence on oil imports and 
thereby enhance its oil security. This project promised 1.5 to 6 billion barrels of oil 
production,184 and its oil characteristics and quality could have been appropriate for 
Australian oil refineries. However, in February 2020, Equinor, the investor company, 
abandoned this project because of the high cost of drilling underwater and the low price of 
oil.185 Instead, Equinor expanded its exploration on Australia’s western coast, near the 
Dorado basin, where it believed more oil reserves and more economic benefits would be 
found.186 Equinor’s new course of action would increase Australian domestic oil 
production, but for the same reason as the Dorado projectnamely, the quality of the 
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Due to the current low oil price, Australia has had difficulty getting investors for 
future oil projects. The investment issue was predicted in the Australia EWP 2015, which 
stated that the price of oil would influence oil exploration and development investment in 
Australia.187 In particular, the EWP explained that the low oil prices, experienced since 
2014, could hinder oil investor companies from putting their capital into the exploration of 
the new oil basin in Australia. These trends will likely continue amid the current situation 
of low oil prices and the recent establishment of competitive mega refineries in Asia.188 
Australia is thus unlikely to have any suitable new crude oil production projects to support 
Australian refineries and therefore Australia’s oil security in the near future. 
 STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVES 
Apart from looking for new conventional oil exploration fields, Australia has also 
worked to increase its strategic oil reserves to improve its oil resilience in the face of oil 
supply disruptions. Since 1979, Australia has been a member of the IEA, which means 
Australia participates in collective actions with other IEA members to respond effectively 
to major oil disruptions.189 Its membership obliges Australia to have in its reserves a 
minimum of 90 days of its previous year’s net oil import. Yet, according to IEA, since the 
end of 2010, Australia has never met this number,190 which indicates its weakness in oil 
security. This inability to meet the IEA requirement was aggravated by the closure of some 
Australian refineries between 2012 and 2015. This event triggered the Australian 
government to adjust its oil reserves to meet IEA compliance, which will automatically 
strengthen its oil security. 
Nevertheless, historically, the Australian government has refused to acknowledge 
or otherwise remedy the weakness of its oil security. The Australian government has 
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resisted intervening directly in the oil sector and has left the industry to manage it.191 This 
stance has triggered some criticism from Australian strategic experts, especially amidst the 
geopolitical uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. They have perceived Australia as having a 
serious problem that endangers Australia’s national interests and have encouraged the 
government to make significant efforts to assess the situation and make recommendations 
to overcome it. 
As a result, the Australian government has recently started to intervene in 
enhancing Australia’s oil security directly. As oil prices dropped, on May 1, 2020, Minister 
for Energy and Emission Reduction Angus Taylor issued a new oil security package in 
order to enhance Australia’s oil security.192 This package shows the alteration of the 
Australian government’s stance toward its oil security.The package highlighted the 
importance of the national oil reserves, domestic storage, and Australian refineries.193 
According to Taylor’s speech in May 2020, “it is time to build our future capacity,” and he 
said that the government would support oil security by issuing a three-part security package 
consisting of implementing government-owned oil reserves, increasing local storage, and 
ensuring Australia’s refineries continue to produce petroleum products.194  
The first part of the package, which aims to increase Australia’s oil reserves, was 
an affirmation of the government action taken a month earlier. On April 22, 2020, the 
Australian government, through the energy department, announced that Australia had 
bought crude oil from the United States for A$94 million, a purchase here included the cost 
for transport and an initial period of ten years’ storage of the oil in the U.S. Strategic 
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Petroleum Reserve (SPR).195 This purchase was an immediate and medium-term objective 
of Australia’s oil policy and was the result of the Australian-U.S. Strategic Partnership on 
Energy in Indo-Pacific. This partnership is discussed in Chapter IV. 
In the second and third parts of the oil security package, the Australian government 
emphasized building up domestic industries to provide oil reserves and maintain its 
domestic oil supply for long-term oil security objectives. The domestic private sector’s 
importance to enhancing oil security has encouraged the Australian government to involve 
local industries in building Australian domestic storage capacity and sustaining domestic 
refineries. Minister Taylor said: “The government wants to assess how we can best partner 
with industry to increase our storage capacity to further enhance our onshore fuel 
security.”196 This statement reflected the Australian government’s awareness that increase 
domestic storage will support Australia’s oil supply in time to respond to a supply shock 
without any delay time for transport, and it eliminates the vulnerabilities of its sea supply 
chain posed by the first part of the oil security package. The request for information (RFI) 
regarding the importance of domestic storage was open to the public through July 15, 2020, 
and the announcement of the next step will be released at the end of 2020.197 
Australia has excellent opportunities to increase its storage capacity by utilizing its 
existing private storage facilities, in addition to completing the postponed the East Arm 
project. According to Australia Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) researchers John Coyne 
and Hal Crichton-Standish, Australia’s bulk oil storage facilities are already available and 
underused, such as Marine services company NT Port and Marine’s facility on Melville 
Island, which offers 30 million liters of tank storage capacity.198 Furthermore, they explain 
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that the new focus of government oil policy could materialize the East Arm’s pending 
project near Darwin, which offers 94 million liters of storage. With all these facilities, the 
Australian government would spend less money than it would on building new facilities. 
Australia will likely have a domestic fuel reserve storage facility soon. On 
September 14, 2020, the Australian government invested A$211 million to enhance its oil 
security by building new fuel storage, creating a minimum stockholding policy, and 
supporting domestic oil industries.199 The Australian government did not clearly explain 
whether the new fuel storage facility will utilize an existing facility or be a genuinely new 
storage facility. Almost all of the funding, namely A$200 million, was allocated to build 
new diesel storage with a capacity of 780 million barrels. According to Minister Taylor, 
the construction of diesel storage will secure Australia’s diesel supplies, which almost all 
Australians are reliant on for their economic needs. The government’s initiative could 
encourage local industries to participate in this project. 
Australian refineries are the last focus of the three-part oil security package. The 
Australian government realizes that Australian refineries face more challenges after the 
decline in production of domestic oil. To secure its refineries in support of Australia’s oil 
security, the government will implement a temporary policy to change standard oil 
requirements to help refineries diminish storage pressure and allow them to keep the 
production pace.200 The government, however, seeks a long-term policy to keep its 
refineries in production. The government is therefore boosting the progress of 
unconventional oil production in Australia to supply crude oil feedstock to Australia’s 
refineries. These unconventional oil resources are further discussed in the next section.  
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Australia will also have a promising new refinery to bolster its oil security in a short 
time, namely the Darwin Clean Fuel refinery.201 This new refinery is expected to provide 
100,000 barrels of refined products per day. Unlike other Australian refineries, the Darwin 
Clean Fuel refinery will convert the domestic production of condensate currently used for 
commodity export. Australian oil production has long been dominated by condensate, 
which made up 64 percent of total production in 2018–19,202 during which time Australia 
produced 250,000 barrels per day.203 By 2030, Australia is forecasted to produce more than 
300,000 barrels of condensate per day.204 According to Tony Debenham, managing 
director of Darwin Clean Fuel, “Australia currently consumes in excess of 1,000,000 
barrels of transport fuels per day and imports 600,000 barrels per day to meet its transport 
fuel needs.”205 He further said that the Darwin refinery, which will be operational in 2023, 
will contribute to significantly bolstering Australia’s fuel security and will also provide 
domestic fuel reserves of 1.1 million barrels of refined products. This refinery will be a 
major contributor to improving Australia’s oil security in the near future. 
Overall, the Australian government’s oil security package will significantly 
improve Australia’s oil security in the near term. The Australian government is likely to 
materialize Australia’s strategic oil reserves soon, which could provide a temporary 
emergency supply of oil in the event of an oil supply disruption. Meanwhile, Darwin 
refinery offers double advantages in bolstering Australia’s oil security by reducing 
Australia’s imported oil and providing an oil reserve facility. 
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 ELECTRIC VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT 
In addition to exploring conventional oil and increasing strategic oil reserves, the 
use of EVs in Australia could significantly help to address Australia’s oil security issues 
by reducing its dependence on imported oil. Australia’s current high dependence on 
imported oil makes it particularly vulnerable to disruptions to its fuel oil supply. Given that 
the transport sector constituted 75 percent of Australia’s total oil consumption in 2019, by 
blending the use of internal combustion engine (ICE) cars with electric vehicles for 
transport, Australia could reduce its oil consumption.206 EVs entirely powered by 
Australia’s reliable electricity production would reduce the country’s reliance on foreign 
oil and so increase its oil security. According to a ClimateWorks Australia 2016 report, the 
increase of EV adoption in Australia would bolster the number of fuel stock days “from 18 
to 21 days in 2030 and 16 to 20 days in 2050,” which means Australia’s dependence on 
imported oil “would decrease 16 percentage points in 2030 and 28 percentage points in 
2050.”207 Similarly, on July 25, 2018, in its submission to the Federal Senate Inquiry into 
Electric Vehicles, Australian Electric Vehicle Association Inc. argued that one million EVs 
in Australia could directly save A$500 million in fuel costs and replace up to A$15 billion 
of fuel imports per year, which eventually could enhance the protection of Australia’s oil 
security against disruption.208 
Through the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA), the Australian 
government defines EVs as “cars or other vehicles with motors that are powered by 
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electricity rather than liquid fuels.”209 ARENA further divides electric vehicles into four 
types, namely battery electric vehicles (BEV), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), 
fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV), and non-plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (HEV). At the 
same time, the Select Committee on Electric Vehicles and the Australian Department of 
Environment and Energy assert that EVs encompass BEVs, PHEVs, and FCEVs.210 
Therefore, these three types of EV are the most likely candidates for strengthening 
Australia’s oil security. 
1. BEVs and PHEVs  
To date, the adoption of electric vehicles in the Australian transport sector has been 
slow, and EVs currently occupy only a small share of the overall sector, but EV 
infrastructure development and beneficial policy by government and private industry are 
encouraging EV use to grow rapidly soon. Based on electric car sales up to June 2020, EVs 
make up a 0.2 percent share of the Australian total vehicle armada, making Australia one 
of the lowest in EV ownership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.211 On the other hand, the EV statistics further show that 
Australia’s EV sales have increased significantly to 0.6 percent of all vehicles sold in 2019, 
which were all BEV and PHEV (see Figure 8).212 This number is expected to continue to 
increase as the price of electric cars declines and the number of charging stations increases. 
According to Infrastructure Australia, by 2040, EVs are expected to account for 70 percent 
to 100 percent of new vehicle sales and at least 30 percent of the vehicle fleet in 
Australia.”213  
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Figure 8. Number of EVs sold in Australia214 
One factor encouraging the rapid growth in EV adoption is the increasingly 
affordable price of EVs compared to ICE cars. According to Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, price parity between EV and ICE cars will be reached sometime between 2024 
and 2040, depending on its segment.215 Bloomberg also predicted that the share of EVs in 
Australia’s vehicle sales will increase from six percent in 2025 to 28 percent in 2030, and 
to 60 percent in 2040.216 In 2040, it is predicted that Australia will house 10 million EVs, 
or 40 percent of the total Australian vehicle fleet, assuming that EVs reach price parity 
with ICE cars.217  
The Australian government’s intervention in the form of policy setting and funding 
is another factor that could encourage Australian’s adoption EVs. In May 2018, Energeia 
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provided a report on the Australian Electric Vehicle Market Study for ARENA and Clean 
Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) that forecasted Australian EV numbers with three 
scenarios: a no intervention scenario, a moderate intervention scenario, and an accelerated 
intervention scenario.218 Energeia forecasted that, without any intervention from the 
Australian government, development of Australian EVs sales would be higher than 
Bloomberg’s prediction, reaching 22 percent of vehicle sales in 2030 and 73 percent in 
2040. Meanwhile, with moderate government intervention, Australia’s EV yearly sales 
would make up 49 percent in 2030 and 100 percent in 2040. Energeia’s last scenario, 
accelerated government intervention, predicted EVs’ yearly sales percentage to be 64 
percent in 2030 and 100 percent in 2040. 
The adoption of electric vehicles has received serious attention from the Australian 
Parliament, which gave the Australian government recommendations to accelerate the use 
of EVs to strengthen Australia’s oil security. On June 27, 2018, the Australian Senate 
formed a Select Committee on Electric Vehicles to investigate electric vehicle prospects, 
profit opportunities, and existing challenges and recommended measures to overcome 
these hurdles.219 After conducting comprehensive inquiries, on January 30, 2019, the 
committee released a report, The Senate Select Committee on Electric Vehicles Report 
2019,220 which contained 17 recommendations to accelerate EV adoption in Australia.221 
In the report, the committee concluded that Australia had lagged behind comparable 
countries in EV development.222 The committee further explained that the lack of a robust 
national policy and strategy was the main point of weakness of the Australian government 
with respect to EVs, alongside other factors, such as higher starting prices for EVs, 
consumers’ concerns over EV range coverage, lack of recharging infrastructure, and 
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available EV model choices. The main recommendations, according to the report, were for 
the government to initiate a national EV strategy, to pioneer the use of EVs, and to build 
an integrated EV charging infrastructure throughout Australia involving federal, state, and 
local governments.  
The Australian government responded positively to the committee’s 
recommendation by developing a national EV strategy and executing several projects to 
accelerate EV adoption. The term “Australian national EV strategy” was officially 
introduced in the Australian Government Climate Solution Package in May 2019.223 
Melissa Price, federal environment minister, confirmed that the Australian national EV 
strategy would be released in the mid-2020s.224 Currently, through ARENA, the Australian 
government funds several projects to eliminate the barriers that prevent people from 
switching from ICE cars to EVs. ARENA has been involved in and has co-funded several 
projects from 2018 to present, such as the Chargefox EV Charging Network Project in 
2018 for A$6 million.225 In 2019, ARENA gave A$15 million for National Ultrafast EV 
Charging Infrastructure Network to provide at least 42 charging sites along the Australian 
east coast highways.226 In early 2020, ARENA funded A$5.3 million for three projects: the 
Origin Energy Electric Vehicles Smart Charging Trial, the Realising Electric Vehicle-to-
Grid Services, and the Energy Freedom Solar Electric Vehicle.227 Most of these projects 
aim to increase the public charging infrastructure across Australia and familiarize 
Australians with EVs.  
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The Australian government continues to accelerate the EV adoption by prioritizing 
the availability of EV charging stations nationwide. In February 2020, Infrastructure 
Australia, the nation’s independent infrastructure advisor, released the 2020 Priority List 
document, which identified national electric vehicle fast-charging networks as one of six 
of Australia’s highest priorities over the next five years.228 Based on the list, the Australian 
government acknowledged that two-thirds of Australian motorists claim that the lack of 
charging stations was the core barrier to EV adoption.229 The government has responded 
by building charging stations. In early 2020, across the government and private sectors, 
Australia had approximately 2,000 charging stations widely dispersed across the 
continent.230 This number was an increase of more than 100 percent compared to 2018, 
when there were only 783.231 By building integrated charging stations nationally, concerns 
about EV driving range limitations can be eliminated and Australia’s EV adoption can be 
stepped up. 
Meanwhile, some Australian state governments have separately released their own 
EV policies to boost EV adoption in their area of responsibility. For instance, the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT) government set the goal to decarbonize its vehicle fleet to 100 
percent electricity and achieve zero-emission by 2045.232 The ACT government has taken 
the lead in the use of EVs for its vehicle fleet. ACT Climate Minister Shane Rattenbury 
said that the “newly leased vehicles for [the] government fleet [will] be 50% by 2020 and 
100 % by 2021.”233 Furthermore, he stated that the ACT local government also has given 
incentives to EV buyers, “including zero stamp duty and 20% discount on registration for 
zero emission vehicles.” He continued by arguing that, due to local government policy 
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limitations, the federal government had to engage in supporting the state governments.  
The role of the federal government would significantly boost EV adoption in Australia. 
Another state government is Queensland, which has released “The Future is Electric” as 
its EV strategy.234 
2. FCEVs (Hydrogen Fuel) 
Like BEV and PHEV, hydrogen FCEV is another promising alternative for the 
future Australian vehicle fleet to enhance Australia’s oil security by reducing its oil 
consumption. Australia is currently entering the initial phase in deploying FCEVs. The 
main encouraging factor in FCEV development is the ambitious goal of the Australian 
government with respect to hydrogen fuel. On November 22, 2019, the Australian federal 
government launched Australia’s National Hydrogen Strategy, which stated that Australia 
aims to be a top global hydrogen exporter by 2030 and to set “a path to build Australia’s 
hydrogen industry.”235 While focusing on hydrogen as an export commodity, this strategy 
also declared the government’s interest in hydrogen vehicles by stating that “one of the 
most exciting prospects for hydrogen is the transport sector–Australia’s largest end user of 
energy.”236 Compared to BEVs, hydrogen vehicles have more energy, cover longer 
distances, and are faster to refuel; and for those reasons, through its national hydrogen 
strategy of 2019, the Australian government supported hydrogen vehicles as “a cost-
competitive fuel option for Australian land and marine transport, in particular for heavy-
duty and long-range transport applications”237 to enhance Australia’s fuel security. 
Australia’s hydrogen goal can likely be achieved due to its abundant resources for 
producing hydrogen. Based on the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO) in the Australian National Hydrogen Roadmap report, hydrogen can 
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be produced in two ways: through a thermochemical or electrochemical process.238 CSIRO 
explains that with carbon capture and storage, the thermochemical method uses natural gas 
through the steam methane reforming (SMR) process and coal through the gasification 
process; meanwhile, the electrochemical method uses electricity to produce hydrogen 
through the electrolysis process. As described in Chapter II of this thesis, Australia has 
abundant natural gas and coal resources, which will remain available for several decades 
and can support Australia’s industry in producing hydrogen. Similarly, due to Australia’s 
strategic location, renewable sources for electricity generation to power the 
electrochemical method are also very abundant in the Australian continent. The Australian 
government claimed that Australia is the leading country in harnessing solar energy and 
one of the top countries for wind resources.239 According to Geoscience Australia, 11 
percent of the Australian continent is appropriate for producing clean hydrogen, of which 
three percent is highly suitable240 and sufficient for the predicted global hydrogen demand 
in 2050 of 230 million tons.241  
The Australian government has spent significantly to boost hydrogen projects. 
Since 2018, the federal government has spent A$147 million and, on May 4, 2020, 
announced an additional A$300 million to be managed by Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation (CEFC).242 Meanwhile, ARENA has separately funded several hydrogen 
projects since 2018. Between 2018 and June of 2020, ARENA invested over A$55 million 
in hydrogen studies and demonstration projects.243 Furthermore, on July 20, 2020, ARENA 
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announced that it will invest A$70 million in accelerating the renewable hydrogen 
development for seven projects that will operate in 2022.  
The Australian government’s seriousness about hydrogen development, in both 
funding and policy, has attracted much investment in hydrogen production projects. 
Several industries are starting to invest in solar-power hydrogen facilities, such as Austrom 
Hydrogen for 3.6 GW, BP Australia for 1.5 GW, Siemens for 5 GW, and Asian Renewable 
Energy Hub (AREH) for 15 GW.244 Kawasaki Heavy Industries agreed to build a hydrogen 
energy supply chain (HESC) pilot project that will be the first and biggest international 
liquid hydrogen supply chain.245 It will produce hydrogen from brown coal to export to 
Japan by 2030. Infinite Blue Energy (IBE) has committed A$300 million to execute the 
Arrowsmith project to build a set of hydrogen facilities in Western Australia.246 The IBE 
explained further that the project is to be powered by wind and solar, producing 25 tons of 
hydrogen per day, and that first production is expected by late 2022.  
In parallel with the development of the hydrogen industry and in accordance with 
its National Hydrogen Strategy, the Australian government has started supporting and 
incorporating hydrogen vehicles in its vehicle fleet. The ACT government is the first state 
government to use hydrogen vehicles in its vehicle fleet. In May 2019, 20 Hyundai NEXO 
hydrogen FCEVs were announced as part of the ACT vehicle fleet, with the first public 
hydrogen station operating in December 2019.247 Victoria made a similar effort to 
implement the hydrogen vehicles in its territory. Funded by ARENA and Toyota for a total 
cost of A$7.4 million, by late 2019, Victoria had a hydrogen center and 13 Toyota Mirai 
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FCEVs, and it will have operational hydrogen electrolyzer and refueling stations by late 
2020.248 The adoption of FCEVs in the government vehicle fleet will continue to accelerate 
the growth of the FCEV as an alternative means of transportation in Australia.  
Australia’s significant hydrogen development, specifically the government’s use of 
FCEVs, has attracted a local car manufacturer, called H2X Australia, to offer a hydrogen 
FCEV option for the Australian people249 and has encouraged the state government to build 
hydrogen fueling stations. H2X plans to produce a hydrogen SUV called Snowy in 2022 
and other hydrogen FECVs, including tractors and trains. Some projects that are funded by 
the Australian government through ARENA and the hydrogen industry are also building 
hydrogen refueling stations. ARENA funded a hydrogen project in Sydney for A$15 
million.250 Furthermore, ARENA-funded hydrogen refueling stations in Queensland will 
be operational by mid-2020,251 and private industries Infinite Blue Energy and NewVolt, 
are participating in providing hydrogen fueling stations and EV fast-charging stations that 
will be operational in 2023 for 17 stations on Eastern Australia highways.252 The various 
option of FCEV in Australia and support infrastructure are other factors that encourage the 
FCEV growth in Australia, which would significantly increase Australia’s oil security. 
 SHALE OIL 
The Australian government’s last domestic approach to increasing its oil security 
is to utilize Australian shale oil resources; Australia has significant shale oil resources 
widespread in several basins across the continent that could support its domestic oil 
demand. According to Geoscience Australia, most of the undiscovered potential 
unconventional oil fields are located in four main oil basins, namely the Cooper Basin, the 
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Canning Basin, the Perth Basin, and the Georgina Basin (see Figure 9).253 In total, 
Geoscience Australia, the data from which is accurate up to August 2018, stated that 
Australia’s unconventional oil resources were 1,534,939 million barrels.254 Nonetheless, 
historically, shale oil production in Queensland did not provide significant output.255 Yet, 
with the success of U.S. shale oil production since 2014,256 the Australian government has 
been encouraged to develop Australian shale oil production to lessen the country’s 
dependence on imported oil, including reviewing its moratorium on fracking methods for 
extracting shale resources. 
 
Figure 9. Australian unconventional oil resources257 
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The Australian government has now therefore approved the hydraulic-fracturing or 
fracking method to extract Australia’s unconventional resources, especially shale gas and 
shale oil. Supported by a report provided by CSIRO’s Gas Industry Social and 
Environmental Research Alliance (GISERA) that stated fracking has little to no impact on 
the environment, the Northern Territory government lifted its fracking moratorium in April 
2018.258 Similarly, after conducting an independent inquiry into hydraulic fracture 
stimulation for one year and projecting a low impact on people and the environment,259 in 
November 2018, the Western Australia government announced its revocation of the 
fracking ban.260 Even though the fracturing area is limited, it covers most of the areas where 
shale resources are available. Since then, some oil and gas companies, such as Black 
Mountain261 and Theia Energy,262 have started to invest in big shale projects, especially in 
the basins containing gas reserves and liquid petroleum and condensate, such as the 
Georgina Basin in Northern Australia and the Canning Basin in Western Australia. 
Australian shale oil production has entered the exploration stage and could be 
operational soon. As of late 2019, there were projects executed in the Canning Basin and 
the Beetaloo Basin.263 While the Beetaloo Basin will mainly be exploited for shale gas 
production, there were indications that this project would further extract shale oil. Minister 
Taylor said in May 2020 that “the government is focused on opening up the Beetaloo Basin 
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in the Northern territory”264 in order to support local refineries. Meanwhile, the Canning 
Basin will mainly produce shale oil. Theia Energy, as the operator of the Great Sandy 
Desert project in the Canning Basin, is expected to produce up to 100,000 barrels oil per 
day of the six billion recoverable-oil from the likely tens of billions of shale oil 
resources.265 This project would require a A$77 billion investment and would be the 
biggest oil-producing project in Australia.266  
The Great Sandy Desert project is waiting for the approval of the land’s indigenous 
owner to become operational. The chairman of the Karajarri traditional lands association, 
Thomas King, said that the project would bring huge benefits to the local people and “will 
probably end up being the biggest oil project in Australia.”267 His statement implies that 
he will likely be a proponent of this project. With the necessary approval, the Great Sandy 
Desert project could produce shale oil in a matter of months. According to the Western 
Australian government in its final inquiry report of 2018, “the time required to drill and 
hydraulically fracture a single well can range from 13–60 days.”268 Theia Energy 
acknowledged the drilling cost challenges, which are several times higher than those in the 
United States, but Theia Energy’s chief operating officer, Jop van Hattum, said that the 
other factors “could tip the balance in favour of the project.”269 Once approval has been 
granted, shale oil would make a significant contribution to Australia’s oil security in the 
near future as it can supply the crude oil for Australian refineries. 
 FINDINGS  
The Australian government has changed its position from leaving Australian oil 
affairs entirely to the market to taking a direct role in strengthening Australia’s oil security. 
The oil packages reflect the Australian government’s changing point of view about the 
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country’s required level of oil security. The Australian government’s previous claims that 
it has highly reliable oil security has changed to taking an active approach to protect against 
supply disruptions. It also has shown the new approach of the Australian government to 
intervene in the oil sector directly. National security interests have overtaken other factors 
that previously were prone to be merely economic interests. The national reserves projects 
in particular demonstrate the government’s seriousness about bolstering and protecting the 
country’s oil supply in case of disruption. Even though the effectiveness of purchasing 
A$94 million from American oil reserves is questioned by Australian strategic experts, its 
purchase gives critical impetus to build Australian domestic storage. The current Australian 
government’s huge investment and determination will very likely attract oil industries to 
participate and commence domestic fuel storage projects in the near future. 
A promising unconventional oil discovery, the Dorado project, and its future 
production will very likely make no contribution to strengthening Australia’s oil security. 
The Dorado oil from offshore Western Australia probably cannot match the characteristics 
and quality of current Australian refineries’ feedstocks. Similar to the existing Western 
Australia oil production, if no upgrades are made to the Australian refineries, the quality 
and characteristics of the Dorado oil would not be suitable for domestic refineries. The 
Dorado oil would not therefore help in strengthening Australia’s oil security, but would 
provide benefits as an export commodity. 
On the otherhand, Australia will have significant input to strengthening its oil 
security with the Darwin Clean Fuel condensate refinery. By producing 100,000 barrels of 
refined products per day, the Darwin refinery, which will be operational in 2023, will 
reduce Australia’s import of refined products by 17 percent. Calculating from Australia’s 
average use of one million barrels of refined products per day, the Darwin refinery will 
contribute ten percent of Australia’s total oil consumption. This project assists long-term 
objectives for Australia’s oil security due to the development of natural gas production that 
automatically increases condensate production as its byproduct. 
The development of EVs will also gradually support Australia’s oil security by 
reducing Australia’s oil needs for transportation. Based on the 2018–19 Australian Energy 
Updates report, the transportation sector accounted for 75 percent of Australia’s total oil 
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consumption, of which road transportation makes up 75 percent. The increases in EV 
adoption are intended to substitute for ICE: in 2040, EVs are predicted to constitute 40 
percent of all the vehicles on Australia's roads. This means EVs will reduce total oil 
consumption by 22.5 percent. While waiting for the federal government to release the 
national EV strategy, state governments’ efforts will likely increase Australian EV 
adoption, following Energeia’s second scenario prediction model, namely moderate 
intervention. This scenario predicts that EVs will offer significant contributions from 2030 
onward. EVs still need a decade to support Australia’s oil security significantly, or maybe 
less than a decade with the federal government’s accelerated intervention. With abundant 
resources for electricity plants and hydrogen production, the government has an 
opportunity to enact further policy that encourages people to shift from ICE vehicles to 
electric vehicles. 
Finally, Australia will have shale oil production soon due to the ongoing project 
that was started at the end of 2019. Shale oil production from the Canning Basin could 
increase the crude oil feedstocks for Australian refineries, which could maintain the 
operation of domestic refineries. The Canning Basin’s shale oil production will also avoid 
the FGEnergy forecast that Australia will close two more refineries by 2027.270 There is 
no further information about the quality of the Canning Basin shale oil, but based on 
Minister Taylor’s statement, it could be suitable for Australian refineries. The short time 
needed for production, only 60 days, will give Australia the opportunity to boost its 
production and reduce its dependence on oil imports. 
In conclusion, Australia will have an additional critical contribution to strengthen 
its oil security from the new Darwin Clean Fuel condensate refinery and its domestic oil 
reserves project. Australia’s oil reserves in the United States provide a small amount of 
additional stockholding required by the IEA but will not help Australia in time in the event 
that Australia experiences oil supply disruption. Meanwhile, shale oil production has to be 
accelerated by obvious federal government policies. In the long term, the use of EVs offers 
an essential contribution to enhance Australia’s oil security in the next decade. 
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IV. AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 
AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL 
OIL SECURITY 
In addition to its domestic efforts, Australia’s dependence on imported-oil supplies 
has encouraged the government to take international measures to increase its oil security. 
Although Australia imports oil from over 50 countries as described in Chapter II, the 
country remains far from secure due to its over-reliance on the Middle East and SLOCs 
that go through the South China Sea. Instead of balancing its supply input among regions 
or diversifying its oil supply from more countries, Australia has attempted to increase its 
oil security by establishing a strategic energy partnership with the United States and has 
taken a significant step toward resolving its maritime border issues with Timor-Leste, 
which could provide other gas and oil resources. 
Nevertheless, as illustrated in this chapter, these two efforts, as well as some others, 
to strengthen its oil security are weak attempts at securing its supplies. This chapter first 
describes the inefficient strategic energy partnership between the United States and 
Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. Next, it discusses the new treaty between Australia 
and Timor-Leste resolving their maritime border, a treaty that is designed to pave the way 
for the Greater Sunrise oil and gas field exploitation project; however, some uncertainties 
in this project do not guarantee its contribution to Australia’s oil security.  
 AUSTRALIA–U.S. STRATEGIC ENERGY PARTNERSHIP IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC 
Australia and the United States have cooperated since World War I, and this 
cooperation is likely to continue in various sectors, including their energy partnership. The 
advantages conferred by this historical cooperation encourage the two states to maintain 
their cooperation.271 In addition, as described in Chapter I, the rise of China that has caused 
geopolitical insecurity and instability in the Indo-Pacific region also adds an impetus for 
furthering this partnership. Both countries perceive that China’s aggressive behaviors 
 
271 Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 61. 
72 
threaten their national interests and require them to forge strategic partnerships in the 
security and economic fields, including the energy sector. 
China’s behavior in the Indo-Pacific region thus underpinned the establishment of 
the Australia-U.S. strategic partnership, which sought to uphold the rules-based 
international order and maintain regional stability. The United States 2017 National 
Security Strategy stated that “China is using economic inducements and penalties, 
influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its 
political aspirations,” all of which endanger trade flow and threaten other states’ 
sovereignty, creating instability in the region.272 Similarly, the Australian 2017 Foreign 
Policy White Paper acknowledged the threats posed by China’s influence in the Indo-
Pacific region, stating that “China will seek to influence the region to suit its own interest” 
by using its economic superiority to achieve strategic ends.273 Therefore, Australia and the 
United States are cooperating to guarantee free trade and economic fairness in the region 
based on the rules-based international order: On February 23, 2018, the two countries 
formed the Australia-U.S. Strategic Partnership on Energy in Indo-Pacific. The White 
House announced that the strategic partnership’s objectives align with the United States’ 
and Australia’s strategic foreign policies, promoting “regional infrastructure and energy 
cooperation, open and competitive energy markets, and improved rules and standards in 
the Indo-Pacific.”274 
The establishment of the Australia-U.S. energy partnership also implicitly aims to 
restrain China’s economic influence in the Indo-Pacific region by preventing more Indo-
Pacific countries from falling into China’s debt–trap economic strategy. According to 
Commander of the USINDOPACOM Admiral Philips’ statement in the Department of 
Defense Indo-Pacific Startegy Report 2019, “Beijing is leveraging its economic instrument 
of power in ways that can undermine the autonomy of countries across the region ... easy 
money in the short term, but these funds come with strings attached: unsustainable debt, 
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decreased transparency, restrictions on market economies, and the potential loss of control 
of natural resources.”275 China’s economic development program, called the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), has ensnared some countries to cede their strategic assets, such as ports, 
due to their inability to pay their debts. Therefore, the Australia-U.S. energy partnership 
also offers an alternative source of funding for Indo-Pacific countries seeking to develop 
their infrastructures. 
Following the establishment of their strategic energy partnership, Australia and the 
United States committed themselves to strengthening and expanding their partnership 
through an annual energy security dialogue. Both countries then discussed this partnership 
during the Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultation on July 24, 2018, broadening the 
partnership to encompass Indo-Pacific and global energy security.276 Then, on October 2, 
2018, Australia and the United States held their first energy security dialogue.277 The U.S. 
Department of State reported that the dialogue produced a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) intended “to enhance the existing framework for bilateral cooperation and 
strengthen areas of mutual interest in the energy sector.”278 In addition, the MoU also stated 
that the partnership aims to facilitate bilateral energy trade and investment, which is 
important for Australia’s oil security. 
The Australia-U.S. strategic partnership thus offers Australia an opportunity to 
strengthen its oil security by supplying oil products to Australia and investing in Australia’s 
domestic oil projects. Through this partnership, coordination among Australia and U.S. 
energy actors becomes stronger and more intense. Eventually, the partnership gives 
Australia access to the U.S. SPR as a way to increase Australia’s oil reserves to protect 
against oil supply disruption. Minister Taylor said that “Australia has been negotiating 
access to the SPR since 2018,” which referred to the Australia-U.S. strategic partnership 
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on energy.279 He further stated that after being granted access to lease the U.S. SPR in the 
previous month, on April 22, 2020, Australia committed A$94 million to buy U.S. oil and 
store it in the U.S. SPR. On June 3, 2020, U.S. Secretary of Energy Dan Brouillette and 
Australia’s Minister of Energy and Emissions Reduction Angus Taylor signed the official 
lease agreement through a virtual ceremony.280 In his speech afterward, Mr. Taylor said 
that this agreement was integral to sustaining Australia’s fuel security and increasing its 
resilience against world oil shocks.281 He further said that this agreement would “contribute 
to Australia’s IEA compliance and strengthen our security.”282 
Nevertheless, Australia’s purchase of American oil does not directly improve 
Australia’s oil security because it would arrive too late in supplying oil to Australia in the 
event of an oil supply disruption resulting from conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Some 
Australian strategic experts have criticized this purchase due to the storage location being 
outside of Australia. For instance, according to Chistian Downie, an Australian research 
council DECRA Fellow from the Australian National University, the purchase of American 
oil “will do little to bolster our energy security given the oil reserves will remain on the 
other side of the Pacific.”283 Obtaining this oil would require at least 35 days’ shipping 
from the United States before it can be processed in Australia.284 The processing time to 
convert the crude oil to the refined product would further delay the oil’s availability to the 
Australian people. The combined shipping and processing time will exceed Australia’s 29 
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days of available daily reserve stock of refined petroleum products.285 If there is a 
disruption of Australia’s oil supplies because of a conflict, these oil reserves will not help 
Australia immediately or in time to supply oil. 
In addition, the purchase of American oil does not improve Australia’s oil resilience 
against oil supply disruption in that it does not add to the diversification of Australia’s 
imported oil suppliers. Australia’s stored oil in the U.S. SPR only functions as a temporary 
aid when Australia experiences oil supply constraints but does not regularly supply 
Australia as does imported oil, which is used daily by the Australian people. Australia’s 
imported oil supplies mostly remain reliant on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which 
are at high risk in the event of direct conflict between the United States and China.  
The purchase of American crude oil is a starting point for the Australian 
government’s action to strengthen its oil security while meeting the IEA requirement to 
hold 90 days of its previous year’s net oil import. Dr. Graeme Bethune, an economic and 
financial analyst, argued that the Australian government has made significant progress in 
the right direction for strengthening its oil security.286 He explained further that at the price 
of $22 per barrel, Australia actually bought 4.2 million barrels, which is four to five days’ 
worth of crude oil for Australian oil consumption. At current production levels, Australian 
refineries can convert 4.2 million barrels of crude oil as raw material over ten days into 
refined products needed by the Australian public.287 Even though the oil reserves location 
is very far away from Australia, this action shows Australia’s commitment to fulfilling the 
requirement set by the IEA.288  
While the Australian-U.S. Strategic Partnership does not itself contribute directly 
to improving Australia’s oil security, it was the catalyst for Australia’s domestic measures 
in the realm of oil development. Shortly after its purchase of American oil, amidst the 
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criticism of this approach, Australia issued its new oil security policy. Australia has since 
started building up its domestic reserves and encouraging its local industries’ role in 
enhancing its oil security. As described in Chapter III, the Australian government is 
committed to funding A$211 million to build domestic oil reserves, creating a minimum 
stock-holding policy, and supporting local oil industries.289  
 THE GREATER SUNRISE, A PROJECT OF AUSTRALIA–TIMOR-LESTE 
JOINT PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AREA 
In addition to the Australia-U.S. strategic partnership, through the new treaty of the 
Greater Sunrise oil and gas field with Timor-Leste, Australia has also sought to open up an 
opportunity to strengthen its oil security while exemplifying its commitment to abiding by 
the rules-based international order. China’s aggressive behaviors in the Indo-Pacific region 
that challenge the existing rules-based international order encouraged Australia to call on 
all the region’s countries to maintain international order and to emphasize peaceful 
settlements for all conflicts and disputes. Australia too showed its commitment to abide the 
international order by resolving its long-lasting maritime border dispute with Timor-Leste 
under the UN mechanism: on March 6, 2018, Australia made a significant decision by 
signing the new treaty concerning its maritime border with Timor-Leste, ratified in July 
2019.290 In March 2018, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated: 
“As Australia identified in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, the treaty is a testament 
to the way in which international law reinforces stability and allows countries to resolve 
disputes peacefully. It is an example of the rules-based order in action.”291 
Australia now has an opportunity to strengthen its oil security via a joint petroleum 
development area with Timor-Leste, namely, the Greater Sunrise offshore gas and oil field, 
which would provide a new source of petroleum product imports. The new Australia–
Timor-Leste treaty paves the way to exploit the Greater Sunrise oil and gas resources, a 
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project that had been long held up due to the maritime border dispute between them. 
Greater Sunrise holds 226 million barrels of condensate and 5.1 trillion cubic feet of gas, 
the commercialization of which would be worth $50 billion.292 Under the treaty, Greater 
Sunrise offers Australia 20 to 30 percent of its total revenue, depending on the processing 
facility’s location.293 If the processing facility is in Timor-Leste, Australia will have a new 
secure and cheap source of imported petroleum products. Due to Australia’s proximity to 
Timor-Leste, Australia will be able to cut shipping costs and eliminate its oil SLOC threats.  
To develop its country and maximize the exploitation of the Greater Sunrise oil and 
gas field, the Timor-Leste government has indeed preferred to have onshore processing 
facilities in its country rather than in Australia, which enhances the prospects offered by 
Greater Sunrise to strengthen Australia’s oil security. Timor-Leste acknowledges that it 
will face a critical challenge once the Bayu Undaan oil and gas project, the largest 
contributor to Timor-Leste’s revenue, ceases in 2022.294 The Timor-Leste government 
therefore envisioned a comprehensive objective of the Greater Sunrise field in its Strategic 
Development Plan 2011–2030, which is “to transition Timor-Leste from a low income to 
upper middle income country by 2030” and proposes the Tasi Mane Project plan as the 
primary way to achieve it.295 The Tasi Mane project is an integrated project, which consists 
of the petroleum Suai Supply Base, the Betano refinery, and the Beaco LNG plant. The 
Timor-Leste government expects that this project could boost GDP growth, create many 
jobs, and establish the national petroleum industry. 
The government of Timor-Leste has made significant efforts to commercialize the 
Greater Sunrise oil and gas field project but it remains unclear when the field will be 
operational due to disagreement among stakeholders. To realize the Tasi Mane project, in 
2018, the Timor-Leste government, through its national oil company, TimorGap, bought 
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out the share of Tasi Mane owned by ConocoPhillips and Shell for $684 million, which 
made Timor-Leste the primary stakeholder of the Greater Sunrise field with a 56.6 percent 
share.296 After removing two opponents of the Tasi Mane project, Timor-Leste now faces 
Australia’s Woodside Petroleum, which is the only hurdle to starting the project. However, 
in 2019, Woodside Petroleum announced its support for the plan, but only for funding the 
offshore project.297 Another important move from the Timor-Leste government was 
signing a contract with China Railway Construction to build LNG plant facilities for $943 
million.298 While Woodside predicted that the project would be online after 2027, 
TimorGap Chief Executive Francisco Monteiro forecasted that the project would be in the 
market between 2025 and 2026.299 
In addition to the business issues, the currently changing political dynamics in 
Timor-Leste are likely to delay or cancel the Tasi Mane project, which also delays or 
cancels the availability of oil products from this project to Australia. In July 2020, the 
Timor-Leste government removed the key persons in the energy sector from the old regime 
under Xanana Gusmao, the proponent of the Tasi Mane project.300 The new minister for 
petroleum and mining, Victor Soares, stated that the current government has a new strategic 
outlook for the petroleum sector and needed to change the leadership of the national oil 
company, TimorGap, to align with it.301 This statement signaled the uncertainty of the 
continuation of the Tasi Mane project. Damon Evans from Energy Voice argued that even 
if this project goes on, it will begin after 2030.302 Furthermore, he noted that some industry 
observers predicted that this project would be canceled for reasons of negative economic 
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impact, which is zero profit, and that the Greater Sunrise oil and gas will be processed in 
Darwin after 2030. The project would only provide Australia with unnecessary additional 
condensate production feedstock for the Australian Darwin Clean Fuel condensate 
refinery. As described in Chapter III, the new Darwin Fuel clean condensate refinery, 
which is expected to be operational in 2023, has enough supply from current Australia 
condensate production. Therefore, the prospect that the Tasi Mane project will provide 
cheap and secure petroleum product for Australia is uncertain or worse, will no longer be 
available. 
 FINDINGS 
Australia’s engagement in international politics to secure its oil supply is a response 
to China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. China’s aggressive behaviors threaten Australia’s 
national interests, especially its energy supply routes. Therefore, the Australian 
government has emphasized the importance of maintaining the Indo-Pacific region’s 
stability by upholding the rules-based international order and creating cooperation. For 
these purposes, while maintaining regional stability through security cooperation with the 
United States, Australia also established a strategic partnership with the United States in 
the energy sector. Similarly, Australia saw the opportunity to enhance its oil security by 
resolving its maritime dispute with Timor-Leste, which at the same time showed its 
commitment to uphold international law under the UN. 
On the other hand, the Australia–U.S. Strategic Partnership on Energy in the Indo-
Pacific does not help Australia’s oil security directly. The partnership does contribute to 
increasing Australia’s compliance with the IEA minimum stockholding obligation and has 
triggered the enhancement of new domestic oil reserves and the domestic industry’s role 
in the energy sector. But the partnership does not diversify Australia’s imported-oil 
suppliers or reduce Australia’s dependence on the Middle East or Southeast Asian 
countries’ oil. The high risk of Australia’s oil supply disruption should there be a direct 
conflict between the United States and China in the region remains the same, namely very 
high. The partnership only increases the amount of Australian IEA stockholding by storing 
Australia’s reserves in the U.S. strategic petroleum reserves. Those reserves will be useless, 
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however, if Australia experiences oil supply disruption because they will not arrive in 
Australia in time to supply oil. 
Meanwhile, the Greater Sunrise oil and gas field exploitation project scenarios 
make uncertain contributions to Australia’s oil security. In the case of the first scenario, 
which involves the continuation of Tasi Mane project, it will provide Australia a secure 
and cheap imported-petroleum product supply. Once the Tasi Mane project is operational, 
especially the Betano refinery, Australia will simultaneously have two advantages: a shared 
revenue stream and a new supplier of refined oil products. Australia’s very close proximity 
to Timor-Leste will reduce threats to the SLOCs for its oil supply. With these resources in 
place, conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, especially on the South China Sea, will not likely 
affect Australia’s oil supply routes. The Timor-Leste refinery will also offer cheaper 
refined petroleum products due to reduced transportation costs. Yet, the Tasi Mane project 
will not begin for at least a decade and will take even longer to produce petroleum products. 
The current political situation in Timor-Leste exacerbates the uncertainty of this project 
development. 
Finally, in the second scenario, as predicted by many energy sector experts, if 
Darwin processes the Greater Sunrise oil and gas, then Australia will not reap the oil 
security benefits of condensate production. The Greater Sunrise field’s additional 
condensate production is not required for Darwin refinery feedstocks, which is likely to be 
exported. Exporting the condensate production will give Australia additional income but 
will not influence its oil security. Therefore, the second scenario, in which the Greater 
Sunrise product is processed at the Darwin facility, will not contribute to enhancing 
Australia’s oil security. 
In sum, Australia’s international efforts to strengthen its oil security through 
partnerships in the energy sector are promising but are weak responses to an issue. The 
strategic energy partnership between Australia and the United States is inefficient because 
it cannot immediately assist Australia if conflict in the Indo-Pacific region were to disrupt 
its oil supplies. Meanwhile, the uncertainties surrounding the Greater Sunrise field mean 
that the Tasi Mane project, which could provide Australia a secure and cheap imported oil 
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sources, is not guaranteed to be operational. Therefore, the country still needs to address 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter synthesizes the findings of this research and offers recommendations 
for the Australian government with respect to strengthening its oil security in case of 
conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. As posited in the third hypothesis, the Australian 
government plans to reduce domestic oil consumption by utilizing technological 
advancements in order to improve its energy security. Contrary to the first and second 
hypotheses, however, Australia is not diversifying its oil exporters and is involving the 
government in strengthening oil security and building new oil infrastructure. Ultimately, 
Australia’s current preparedness efforts to enhance its oil security do not wholly help the 
country in the near future, because domestic efforts will not be effective until 2023 at the 
earliest. Meanwhile, Australia does not have any substitute oil source in the event of 
disruption. Therefore, in addition to increasing its domestic oil production reserves and 
also reducing its oil consumption, Australia most importantly needs to diversify its oil 
sources so that they are more evenly distributed across several supply regions; it needs to 
especially find suppliers in regions where oil supply lines are not threatened by direct 
conflict between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region. That way, 
Australia will reduce the risk of losing most of its imported oil supply in the event of a 
conflict. 
 SYNTHESIS 
Apart from oil, Australia’s abundant natural resources have long enabled the 
country to meet its energy needs. Australia has used these resources for domestic 
consumption and also as export commodities, and these commodities contribute 
significantly to the Australian GDP. At present, Australia’s coal and natural gas are more 
than sufficient for its domestic electricity and gas consumption. Along with the 
development of renewable energy and the current rate of electricity generation and export, 
Australian coal and gas can support the country for the next several decades. The situation 
is different for Australia’s oil resources. Since its peak in 2001–02, Australia’s domestic 
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oil production has declined, and this trend has pushed Australian reliance further toward 
imported oil, which now makes up 91 percent of its total oil consumption.303  
Australia’s heavy reliance on oil imports undermines its oil security, as there is an 
imminent danger to its imported oil supply due to increasing tensions between the United 
States and China that could lead to direct conflict. Historically, the Indo-Pacific region’s 
advantageous geopolitical situation has protected Australia from experiencing significant 
imported oil supply disruptions. As a result, the Australian government has long believed 
that its energy industries could address possible disruptions to its oil supply through a 
market-based approach. Therefore, the Australian government formerly adopted a policy 
of not intervening in the petroleum sector except in emergencies and as a last resort.  
China’s rise, however, has increased geopolitical tensions and uncertainty in the 
Indo-Pacific region, which has affected Australia’s perspective about its oil security. 
Australia is certain to side with the United States in a confrontation with China and may 
get directly involved if there is an open conflict with China. Because Australia imports 
most of its oil from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the country’s oil SLOCs will 
become vulnerable in such an event. Australia’s alliance with the United States means that 
China poses an enormous threat to most of Australia’s SLOCs and, therefore, its imported 
oil supply. As a result, the Australian government has taken a more active role to improve 
its oil security. 
Given these circumstances, this thesis has sought to answer the research questions 
raised in Chapter I: First, how does Australia try to ensure its oil security, especially with 
its vulnerability to oil supply disruptions due to uncertain maritime security? This thesis 
has offered three potential explanations and hypotheses: the Australian government 
diversifies its oil exporter countries, notably to countries outside areas at risk of conflict; 
the Australian government will continue to execute a market-based policy that emphasizes 
economic advantages, which keep its dependency on imported oil, and that keep the 
government from interfering directly in Australia’s oil sector; and the Australian 
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government reduces domestic oil consumption to improve the country’s energy security by 
utilizing technological developments. The findings of this thesis verify the third hypothesis 
but are contrary to other two. Although Australia has historically had an uninterrupted 
supply of imported oil, in the current uncertain geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific 
region, the Australian government has shifted its position on the security of its imported 
oil supplies from self-confident to self-prepared; it has thus tried to increase its oil security 
by reducing its heavy reliance on imported fuel sources by intervening directly in building 
oil infrastructure and utilizing technological advances but has not increased the diversity 
of its oil suppliers. 
Australia’s international measures to strengthen its oil security have included 
establishing strategic energy partnerships and cooperation with the United States and 
Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, Australia’s partnerships do not contribute to the diversification 
of Australia’s oil suppliers, which is in contrast with the first hypothesis. The Australian 
government continues to believe that its oil suppliers are sufficiently diversified because 
they are derived from more than 50 countries. Furthermore, contrary to hypothesis two, the 
Australian government has taken actions, both domestically and internationally, to 
intervene directly in this sector, using preventive measures to maintain Australia’s oil 
supply. The government no longer will let Australia’s energy industries handle Australia’s 
oil security alone. Driven by much criticism from several Australian strategic experts, the 
Australian government has initiated domestic efforts to increase the country’s oil resilience 
by increasing domestic oil production, developing national oil reserves, setting a minimum 
stockholding policy, and building storage facilities. In line with hypothesis three, Australia 
also has tried to reduce its oil consumption by capitalizing on developments in vehicle 
technology through the use of EVs.  
Second, in what ways will Australia’s strategic partnerships assist in its quest for 
improved energy security? This thesis finds that Australia’s international cooperation and 
strategic partnerships do not directly contribute to Australia’s oil security. The Australia-
U.S. strategic partnership merely enhances Australia’s compliance with the IEA’s 
minimum requirements for oil stockholding. This strategic partnership will almost 
certainly not help Australia respond to oil supply disruptions in the event of conflict in the 
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Indo-Pacific region because the time it takes to ship the oil exceeds the average duration 
of oil reserves in Australia. In addition, cooperation between Australia and Timor-Leste in 
managing oil and gas fields, in particular the Greater Sunrise, is also still far from being 
realized; if it is realized, it will take more than a decade. The project’s questionable utility 
is compounded by its possible use of the Darwin processing facility, the output of which 
does nothing to contribute to Australia’s oil security. 
The findings of this thesis also reveal that only some of the Australian government’s 
domestic efforts significantly enhance its oil security. National oil reserves and a new 
condensate refinery are likely to increase Australia’s oil security in the near term. The 
national oil reserves projects will improve Australia’s resilience against oil supply 
disruption by increasing the amount of available oil reserves that could be used 
immediately in the event of supply disruption. Similarly, the new condensate refinery will 
reduce Australia’s imported refined product by 17 percent and will provide petroleum 
product reserves at the same time.  
By contrast, other domestic initiatives, such as conventional oil production, shale 
oil exploration, and EV adoption will not contribute or will take a long time to make a 
significant contribution to strengthening Australia’s oil resilience. For one, Australia’s 
enormous conventional oil production project of the future, the Dorado project, will not 
increase Australia’s oil security. As described in Chapter II, Dorado oil’s characteristics 
and quality, which are likely to be highly similar to current Western Australian oil, will not 
be suitable for Australian refineries. In addition, the current Australian shale oil exploration 
remains in the initial phase, requiring more infrastructure developments and business 
arrangements by the government to be operational. Furthermore, Australia’s ability to self-
sustain in producing electricity and hydrogen to power EVs offers huge opportunities in 
reducing its oil consumption in the long term. Yet, the absence of federal government 
policy on the Australian adoption of EVs means that EVs’ contribution to strengthening 
Australia’s oil security will be felt only after 2030. The Australian state governments’ 
individual efforts are likely to only increase the proportion of electric vehicles in Australia 
to 40 percent of all vehicles by 2030 and to 100 percent only by 2040. As tensions and 
uncertainties in the geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific increase, two decades is a very 
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long time in helping improve Australia’s oil security in an effort to anticipate the 
consequences of open conflict in the region. 
 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given these findings, this thesis proposes the following recommendations. First, 
the Australian federal government has to accelerate the adoption of EVs by establishing a 
national EV strategy as soon as possible, which will drastically reduce its domestic oil 
consumption and thereby increase its oil security. Given its abundant resources to generate 
electricity and to produce hydrogen, Australia will have no difficulties in powering its EVs, 
both BEVs and FCEVs. With a comprehensive Australian federal government policy, as 
Energia forecasts, Australian EV sales are expected to make up 100 percent of Australian 
car sales by 2030. Once road transportation has switched mostly to EV, Australia will 
reduce its total oil consumption by 57 percent. Thus, Australian oil consumption will be 
used primarily for air and maritime transportation, which will steadily increase in the 
future; this approach also aligns with the current government’s plans for a minimum 
stockholding policy and a diesel storage facility.  
Furthermore, regarding Australian domestic oil production, Australia has to be able 
to utilize its current domestic oil production and the next huge promising oil output from 
the Dorado project and shale oil. Therefore, Australia needs to upgrade its refineries or 
build a new refinery that can process Western Australia’s oil into refined products for 
domestic consumption, instead of for export commodity, which does not contribute at all 
to strengthening Australia’s oil security. Similarly, Australia’s shale oil exploration also 
has to be supported by significant Australian government policy. The short time required 
for shale oil production offers Australia an immediate significant contribution to supply its 
domestic refineries, which also reduces Australia’s dependence on oil imports. Once 
Australia starts to produce shale oil and combine it with its conventional oil production for 
its refineries’ feedstock, the existing Australian refineries could provide 40 percent of the 
refined petroleum products for domestic consumption, which also reduces its crude oil 
imports significantly.  
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Finally, most important is that Australia reevaluate its belief that its imported oil 
supplies are secure. Notwithstanding the Australian government’s current efforts to 
improve its oil security, Australia still remains at high risk of experiencing imported oil 
supply disruption. As Chapter II explained, despite procuring oil from more than 50 
countries, if its SLOCS are threatened, Australia is still at risk of losing 67 percent of its 
total oil imports, amounting to 75 percent of its refined products and 55 percent of its crude 
oil. In particular, Australia’s imported petroleum products are mostly supplied by 
Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and China. Were the United States and China to go to war, 
these four main suppliers of Australia’s refined products would automatically not be able 
to export their refined products because China will cut off their oil refinery feedstocks. 
Therefore, increasing the imported oil supply from regions secure from direct conflict 
between the United States and China, supported by the increased domestic efforts of the 
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